



Institute for Conflict Analysis
and Resolution


FRAMEWORKS FOR INTERPRETING CONFLICT

A Handbook for Journalists

Richard E. Rubenstein
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John B. Stephens

ICAR REPORT #2

George Mason University



An Excerpt from:

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George Mason University

Fairfax, Virginia

1994

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INTRODUCTION

What is "the news" about? International conflicts and communal wars. Religious upheavals and racial disorders. Political debates and family disputes. Arrests, shootouts, strikes, layoffs, feuds, fistfights...and lawsuits (always lawsuits). From page one to the gossip column and the sports page, the news is frequently about human conflict.

Well-meaning people sometimes ask, "Why can't journalists report the good news, too?" The answer is: They do! But reports of successful peace or contract negotiations, of programs that promise to alleviate crime or racial unrest, sensible political compromises, acts of personal sacrifice, and family reconciliations are also about people in conflict. The good news simply focuses on the conflict's settlement, prevention, or resolution rather than on its continuance or escalation.

To be a journalist, then, is to be a conflict specialist. Many reporters and editors may be surprised to hear themselves described this way, but journalists spend much of their time and energy describing and interpreting the behavior of individuals and groups in conflict. They are expected not only to get the facts straight -- a difficult enough project where one contestant's "facts" are another's "myths" -- but to put diverse struggles in context: to make sense of their origins, history, dynamics, and prospects for resolution. At the same time, news

organizations expect their employees to write to deadline, to report on groups or situations with which they may not be very familiar, avoid bias, and make their observations clear to the inexpert reader or viewer. Little wonder that journalists sometimes fall short of satisfying all these demands.

Teachers and practitioners in the field of conflict analysis and resolution are also conflict specialists. They devote their energies to theorizing about human conflict, analyzing specific conflict situations, and helping warring parties to resolve their differences. The academics, generally speaking, are free not only of the "negative" pressures of deadline and assignment, but of the "positive" pressure to make their ideas available and useful to the public. Little wonder that they frequently end up talking mainly to themselves.

This handbook is an attempt to bridge the gap between the academic and journalistic approaches to the interpretation of conflict. It demonstrates how significant ideas about the causes, dynamics, and termination of social conflict can improve news reporting and commentary and enrich the journalistic enterprise. It also suggests ways in which academics can learn from journalists.

Although its primary focus is theoretical, the handbook addresses many questions of practical interest to working reporters and editors. For example: How do theories of conflict influence a reporter's judgment about relevant sources of information? How do these theories determine the kinds of

questions journalists ask? How does a reporter using a particular framework know that he or she is getting a better story than the competition? And how can a reporter's knowledge of conflict resolution processes change the way he or she covers a story? In order to discuss these questions concretely, each section of the handbook includes questions for reporters, followed by a brief illustration demonstrating how the theoretical material might be used in covering a specific conflict. In the first chapter, "Journalism and Conflict Resolution," we analyze the roles journalists play in changing people's attitudes towards conflict and, sometimes, in influencing the outcomes of disputes. Chapter II, "Thinking About Conflict," discusses how conscious and unconscious theories shape the ways we perceive and report on social conflicts. Chapters III, IV, and V, on paradigms of conflict, describe the leading theoretical frameworks used in interpreting conflict, emphasizing ideas that may help to explain major stories now in the news.

The sixth chapter, "Conflict Management and Resolution Processes," outlines the key concepts and processes now being used as alternatives to traditional methods of settling conflicts. Chapter VII, "A Concluding Note," converts some of the materials discussed earlier into a list of "do's and don't's" for journalists. Finally, an Appendix, "Conflict Analysis and Resolution Resources," lists bibliographical and human resources

that are available to journalists seeking to understand specific types of conflict.

This study was inspired by a conference held in April 1990 at Airlie House outside Washington, D.C., involving some eighty print and broadcast journalists, conflict analysts and conflict resolution specialists. Called Interpreting Violent Conflict, it was co-sponsored by the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution of George Mason University, American University's School of Communications, the Washington Chapter of the National Association of Journalists, the Black Press Institute, and the John T. and Catherine MacArthur Foundation. A summary of the conference proceedings is available from the George Mason University Bookstore, Fairfax, Virginia 22030.

The publication of this handbook was made possible by the generosity of the National Institute for Dispute Resolution (NIDR) in Washington, D.C., a key institution in the conflict resolution field. NIDR's patient assistance is most gratefully acknowledged. The authors also appreciate the insightful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript made by faculty members and graduate students at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

Much of the Appendix to this handbook was originally prepared by Frank O. Blechman, Gretchen Reinhardt, and the late Dr. James H. Laue. We are grateful for their permission to use this material. Thanks also to Lisa Schirch-Elias for her work in

supplementing the Appendix and to Jerri Shevlin for her valuable editorial assistance.

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I. JOURNALISM AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Journalists often define themselves simply as reporters of conflict. According to this notion, the role of a journalist is not to advocate or defend the actions of any party embroiled in conflict. Nor do they think their task has anything in common with that of outside intervenors, the so-called third parties to the conflict, who may be trying to end it.

The assumption is therefore that the reporter's job is merely to report: to describe what is happening as accurately and vividly as possible in a few hundred words (or a few dozen, or ninety seconds of videotape and some text). So while parties argue or fight, and third parties intervene on one side or the other or try to mediate a settlement, most journalists see their role as neutral to these interactions. Whether covering a divorce, a neighborhood dispute, or a civil war, journalists strive to be objective and to avoid playing favorites. The task is not to help one side or the other win. It is not to provoke or hinder outside intervention, or even to assist mediators to arrange a settlement. The journalist's primary mission is to tell the truth about the conflict so that other people may decide how to deal with it.

Up to a point, this perspective makes perfectly good sense. But as an approach to understanding the dynamic relationship between media coverage of a conflict and the conflict itself, it

has limitations. Reporters always run the risk of acting as press agents for conflicting parties or becoming advocates for outside intervention. Falling into this trap means losing one's ability to "see" the conflict and to describe it accurately. It also means running the ultimate risk of losing one's credibility in the eyes of the parties or the public. Still, we know that there is no societal "Great Wall of China" separating journalists from the conflicts they cover. However much reporters may try to "distance" themselves from the disputing parties, the act of reporting on any conflict influences it in myriad, often profound, ways.

As all journalists know, their mere presence on the scene often alters the behavior of parties to conflict. "The whole World Is Watching" -- the chant of antiwar demonstrators at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago -- is now a fact or possibility that influences conflict behavior around the globe. In this regard, U.N. observers in Bosnia have noted that the presence of journalists, especially camera crews, have on several occasions prevented (or, perhaps, postponed) atrocities. We also recall how the appearance of news cameras during anti-apartheid rallies in South Africa and Solidarity demonstrations in Poland was blamed for inciting riots for international media consumption. Movements of oppressed people throughout the world now understand the power of the international media to bring pressure to bear on their oppressors. For such organizations or peoples the media play a direct role in their conflicts; for

them, journalists are potential tools in their struggle to change the power relationships between the parties.

The effects of reporting on the dynamics and outcomes of conflict are even more influential when they are less obvious. The dramatic formula of "A versus B" can be played out in a myriad of variations, each producing a different effect. Simply by beginning a story with Party A striking Party B, for example, the reporter can portray A as the aggressor, obscuring the fact that A's act may have been a response to more subtle blows previously struck by B. The justification for a particular story format sometimes rests on production values, such as the availability of time and space. Presentational techniques or other media conventions can therefore influence which elements of a conflict get highlighted or even omitted from a particular report.

Virtually every technical and editorial decision made by journalists in presenting a conflict has potential consequences for the conflict itself. Consider the impact of the decision to treat a particular individual or organization as a representative of a larger party to the conflict. When the international media recognized Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress as the primary representatives of South Africa's Black community, for example, the ANC's position vis a vis its internal and external adversaries was greatly strengthened.

Furthermore, news coverage can strongly influence the way outside parties relate to the conflict. To take a recent

example, the presence of print and broadcast journalists in besieged Sarajevo in 1994 undoubtedly contributed to the "tilt" towards the residents of that city, and against their Serbian besiegers, on the part of NATO and the United States. One also recalls the enormous impact of televised images of protestors being hurled into the air by the pressure of fire hoses or being set upon by police dogs during the heyday of the American civil rights movement. During the Vietnam War, it is generally agreed, news coverage emphasizing the appalling human costs of that struggle eventually helped catalyze U.S. domestic opposition to continuing the war. By contrast, the media's willingness to abide by highly restrictive rules governing journalists during the Persian Gulf War, their inclination to feature film of "smart bombs" and other news material supplied by military sources, and their acceptance, overall, of the U.S. government's version of the events and personalities leading up to the war, helped mobilize a high level of public support for violent intervention against Iraq.

Of course, news organizations are not all-powerful. If the Persian Gulf War had produced a large number of casualties on the American side, journalists would undoubtedly have been obliged to report these facts as well, and support for the war might have become eroded, as happened in the case of Vietnam. But the Gulf War illustrates the way in which parties to conflict try to "capture" reporters by getting them to view the conflict through partisan eyes. This happens more readily, of course, when the

conflicting parties have unequal access to the media, when one party is able to control the flow of information, and when the events being reported take place in some distant land.

A recent illustration is the success enjoyed by Russian president Boris Yeltsin and his U.S. supporters in 1993 in getting American journalists to see Yeltsin's shelling of the Russian parliament as a necessary method of saving Russia from an alleged conspiracy of "Fascists and Communists." By contrast, attempts by opposing forces to mobilize the media in their favor in the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were less successful. In this case, the conflict was close at hand. Both sides were able to make their voices and perspective heard; public opinion remained divided; and Congress's decision was finally made on the basis of power-bargaining among "insiders."

As we write, the power of the modern journalist, especially the television journalist, is clearly apparent in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and other sites of conflict. The suffering of civilians in these wars has forced reporters to face an ethical dilemma. Do they report the human suffering in a detached, factual manner, or should they highlight the carnage in such a way that public pressure might bring about outside intervention? Furthermore, if certain types of intervention (for example, economic sanctions, the lifting of arms embargoes, or direct military intervention) have the potential to increase human suffering, should journalists also take this into account?

Invoking traditional formulas about journalistic objectivity may not be of much use in answering such questions. The journalist may still be forced to choose between the conflicting roles of spectator and participant.

Journalists and Conflict Resolvers: Similarities

Bill Blakemore of ABC-TV News has frequently noted the structural similarities between the roles and tasks of journalists and conflict resolvers. Reporters or commentators who remain independent of the parties to conflict, and mediators who assist disputants to resolve their differences, share certain similarities of position, function, and even attitude. Like conflict resolvers, reporters begin by analyzing the conflict in order to determine who the parties are, what issues motivate them, what underlying problems may be generating the dispute, and what outcomes are probable or possible. Like "third party" mediators or facilitators, they restrain their inclination to take sides in order to present opposing points of view fairly and accurately. And, again like conflict resolvers, they try to recognize where a specific debate, issue, or controversy falls on the cycle of conflict, whether escalation or deescalation is likely to occur, and whether a synthesis of opposing views -- an agreement capable of resolving the dispute -- is possible.

Most important, journalists are also "third parties" to conflict, actors whose decisions, even if they are acting as nonpartisan neutrals, can strongly influence the course and outcome of a struggle. At times, in fact, media representatives have played a direct role in helping resolve serious conflicts. In 1962, for example, John Scali, who was at the time a correspondent assigned to the State Department, became a major figure in the solution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. With confirmed Soviet nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba and a U.S. naval blockade around the island, the diplomatic relationship between Moscow and Washington was so strained that face-saving back-channel negotiations were required. At the request of a Soviet diplomat, Scali functioned as an intermediary between the two superpowers, providing a form of "shuttle diplomacy" that may have helped to avoid a nuclear disaster.

Fifteen years later, the invention of satellite television provided what some consider to be the birth of "television diplomacy." In 1977, Walter Cronkite spoke by satellite with Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in Cairo and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin in Jerusalem. After permitting the two leaders to state their positions, the anchorman played a mediator's role, asking President Sadat if he would go to Jerusalem to meet Prime Minister Begin face to face. When Sadat agreed, Cronkite asked if Begin would receive the Egyptian president, and Begin's agreement to do so paved the way for a

historic meeting in Jerusalem five days later. This meeting led ultimately to the Camp David Accords of 1979.

While journalists do not ordinarily bring parties to conflict together either on screen or by arranging a direct dialogue between them, they frequently provide a direct or indirect forum for the exchange of views and consideration of various options for conflict resolution. "Op-ed" pages often juxtapose opposing views, and similar print forums have become standard in most urban and large suburban newspapers. Radio talk shows regularly air conflicting opinions on a wide spectrum of current controversies, with the program's host sometimes "mediating" by clarifying the callers' views and challenging the feasibility of suggestions made to resolve the dispute. Television discussion programs and roundtables have proliferated since the early 1980s, with the host, in some cases, functioning as a facilitator. One recalls Ted Koppel's now-famous "Nightline" broadcast on ABC from Jerusalem, featuring Palestinian and Israeli speakers who were destined to play important roles in later peacemaking efforts. Koppel and "Nightline" also have the distinction of being the first to bring the main disputants in South Africa together for a debate on apartheid issues, albeit electronically. This television event occurred in 1985, years before the African National Congress and the South African government entered into formal negotiations.

All these forms of reporting generally adhere to the first principle of mediation, which is to give all parties involved an

opportunity to present their views. In the process of giving each side a hearing, several important steps toward conflict resolution can occur: the parties may be educated about each other's point of view; stereotypes are challenged; and initial perceptions can be reevaluated and clarified.

Furthermore, reporters sometimes ask questions that lead the conflicting parties to identify and discuss the deeper interests and needs that underlie their public positions. This "reframing" is standard procedure in conflict resolution processes aimed at helping disputants identify the shared problems that are causing the conflict. At times, journalists spot a problem-solving option or basis for agreement that the parties have not considered and are able to put these ideas into circulation. Quite often, they find themselves in the position of explaining to the public -- and sometimes to the parties -- how a peacemaking process works. During a sensitive negotiation, journalists manage the difficult task of keeping the public informed, while protecting the integrity of the process and the confidentiality of sources. And during the implementation stage of public agreements, they can play an important monitoring role by reporting on adherence to or breaches of agreement.

We can summarize these points of agreement between journalists and conflict resolvers as follows: Both are nonpartisan "third parties" whose activities often influence the dynamics and outcomes of a conflict even though they do not act

as disputants. Both are committed to analyzing conflicts as accurately and penetratingly as possible, which means allowing the disputing parties themselves, as well as interested outsiders, to tell their stories. Both look into the future, to the extent possible, in order to evaluate the possibilities of conflict escalation, deescalation, or settlement. And both are compelled in the process of analysis to make decisions that are, in the broadest sense, "political" (because of their potential impact on the parties or on the outcome of the dispute).

In the 1990s, for example, news media in the United States decided to report on a wide variety of disputes, claims, and counterclaims in the area of sexual harassment and abuse. In effect, the journalists put gender conflict on the map of public consciousness by "recognizing" it in the same way that they had previously recognized conflicts between racial and ethnic groups. In doing so, reporters and editors have exposed themselves to the usual litany of accusations: they are inflaming the conflict, exaggerating the issues, playing favorites, and so on. In one sense, of course, these charges are justified: recognizing a particular form of conflict usually benefits those disadvantaged by its prior "invisibility." But the genie of gender conflict cannot be put back into the bottle, nor should it be. How accurately, sensitively, and deeply journalists analyze this difficult topic may well influence the course of male-female relationships in America for decades to come.

Journalists and Conflict Resolvers: Differences

Although both journalists and conflict resolvers are in the business of conflict analysis, it would be foolish to minimize the differences in their perspectives and situations when it comes to conflict resolution. To begin with, they work for different employers. Mediators and facilitators are responsible to the disputing parties, but journalists produce a commodity that news organizations must sell to the reading, listening, or viewing audience and to advertisers. In the past, this has led many news organizations to dramatize conflicts (either openly or tacitly) by focusing on irreconcilable differences between the parties, extreme positions and inflammatory statements, violent or threatening acts, and win-or-lose outcomes. A common assumption is that while "conflict sells," cooperation, or the process of resolving conflict, does not.

Furthermore, the news media ordinarily attend to conflicts only at points of high public interest, such as dramatic escalation or deescalation phases, unusually violent incidents, peace treaties, or other events considered especially newsworthy. Conflict resolvers, on the other hand, attempt to intervene both as analysts and as mediators (although they do not always succeed) before the conflict has reached a highly intense and destructive level. For example, many companies, universities, and other organizations managing increasingly diverse populations have implemented systems to spot incipient group conflicts and

deal with their causes before they produce explosions. If these systems are effective, the organizations may congratulate themselves on staying "out of the news." But an important story -- how local institutions can prevent destructive conflict from occurring -- remains untold.

Other differences also deserve attention. Journalists reach a much larger audience than do conflict resolvers, and the price they pay for this influence is a willingness to work within strict constraints of time and reporting space. There are obvious limits to the extent to which they can "specialize" in a particular conflict or do follow-up stories on "old news." Moreover, the financial constraints on news organizations may lead them to conclude, for example, that while the situation in Moldova, Brazil, or other foreign locale is quite explosive, they simply cannot afford to cover it. And even where they do cover it, they may insist, quite reasonably, that their purpose is not to resolve disputes between the Moldovans or Brazilians, but simply to let the public know what is going on.

In fact, this insistence on the public's "right to know" may put journalists in direct conflict with mediators or other facilitators who, for many reasons, usually prefer to deal with the conflicting parties outside the spotlight of publicity. When the reporter asks, "How are the negotiations going?", and the facilitator answers, "What negotiations?", one recognizes that there are functional differences between journalists and conflict resolvers!

Reporters are accustomed to dealing with bureaucrats, business executives, and others who have a penchant for secrecy. One of their tasks is to keep the public informed by penetrating this self-protective, often self-serving, wall of silence. But conflict resolvers have reasons of their own for maintaining privacy in their work. Facilitating discussion of a serious social conflict requires that the parties be free to make statements, take positions, and consider alternatives that would be politically suicidal if done publicly. Problem-solving and publicity on difficult, divisive conflicts seldom mix. An analytical conflict resolution process cannot take place where the participants are playing to an audience or fearing its reaction. In this respect, it is interesting to compare the quasi-public negotiations sponsored by the U.S. government in an attempt to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the more effective private process facilitated by the Norwegians in 1993-1994. While the negotiations in Madrid and Washington became the proverbial media circus, Norwegian facilitators acting under conditions of strict secrecy and confidentiality succeeded in midwifing the "Declaration of Principles" that became the basis for the Israeli withdrawal from Jericho and the Gaza Strip in 1994.

In certain cases, peacemaking efforts can be derailed merely by revealing that they are taking place. Indeed, there are several known instances in which a revelation that peace talks were occurring was followed by the assassination of one or more

Let us return to the basic assumption of news marketing that conflict sells, while cooperation does not. While questioning this assumption, we do not suggest that journalists should downplay conflict, avert their eyes from the ugly facts of hatred and violence, or "cry peace where there is no peace." Nor do we believe that reporters and news editors should attempt to "balance" stories of bitter conflict with news about sweet resolution. On the contrary, by intensifying their focus on social conflicts -- by covering conflict stories with more continuity and in greater depth -- journalists can provide invaluable services to the conflicting parties and to society.

New Attitudes Towards Reporting on Conflict

participants. Extreme nationalists, in particular, may consider talking with the "enemy" to be a form of treason punishable by death. Many journalists, informed that sensitive private talks are taking place, have chosen (at least temporarily) to "sit" on the story in order to give the process a chance to succeed, and, perhaps, to save lives. But suppressing news, even for the best of reasons, carries with it other dangers. Ultimately, how journalists reconcile their commitments to life and peace with their obligations to employers and audiences is ultimately a very personal decision.

Good reporting and news analysis should look beyond stated positions toward the interest and needs of the parties. Such reporting assists disputants and conflict resolvers to get to the root of the problems causing the conflict, and tells us what a conflict is really about. Reporters and commentators can put a conflict in historical and social perspective, deepening everyone's understanding of it. They can call attention to dangers of escalation and to opportunities for settlement that the parties may not have recognized. And they can become part of an "early warning system" that identifies the underground tremors of impending conflict, thus permitting earlier responses to it. For example, Robert D. Kaplan's analytical journalistic study in The Atlantic Monthly (February 1994) gives early warning to citizens and policymakers about the global impact of impending environmental disasters that the author thinks could cause serious conflict as nations break up, borders crumble, and essential resources become scarce. Media tasks such as early warning require that journalists pursue their legitimate interests in reporting on conflict rather than looking for "good news" and less disturbing or "happier" subjects.

At the same time, though, it is worth considering a suggestion made recently by Joann Byrd, writing as ombudsman for The Washington Post. In covering conflict stories, Byrd states, journalists should add an "S" for Solutions and a "C" for Common Ground to the traditional "five W's" formula (Who, What, When, Where, Why). She entreats reporters to go beyond describing a

conflict merely in terms of poles of opposition. "The search for commonality and agreement," she argues, "should become a journalistic knee-jerk."

We agree, but with this proviso: that the basis for agreement between seriously alienated parties can be determined only on the basis of thorough and sensitive analysis. A bit later in this handbook, we suggest that serious conflict is most often the result of a mismatch between human needs and institutional structures. Reporters investigating the basis for possible conflict resolution therefore need to ask two types of question. First, what do the parties need in order to end their conflict? This may not be the same as what they say they want, but only the disputants themselves can identify their needs. Second, how has the system that embraces the disputing parties failed them? Discovering a basis for agreement generally means diagnosing a system-failure and exploring the possibilities of correcting it.

Adopting Joann Byrd's excellent suggestion, therefore, requires more than a change of attitude on the part of journalists. It implies a search for the roots of the conflict that challenges them to exercise their powers of analysis and imagination to the full. That this is possible we know from numerous examples. To cite one recent instance of pathfinding conflict coverage, Tod Robberson's reports for The Washington Post on the January 1994 "Zapatista" rebellion in Mexico's Chiapas Province brilliantly clarified both the causes and nature

of that conflict and the system-changing measures that will probably be necessary to resolve it. Robberson put his readers in the shoes of all the parties to that conflict, and he managed to do so readably and dramatically, working as a reporter and not as an academic writer. Similar examples could be multiplied; our point is that one can succeed both as a storyteller and an analyst.

This leaves us with the question raised earlier: Can cooperation, or activities that avert conflict by eliminating its causes, be considered marketable news? Public tastes in this regard are more flexible and varied, perhaps, than many news organizations think. It may be the case that stories of everyday cooperation and conflict aversion (people shoveling each other's walks during a snowstorm, for example) will remain of minor interest to much of the reading/listening/viewing public. "Human interest" items seldom make front page news. But where a difficult problem faced by a large number of people has been successfully solved by some, the level of interest in the story rises precipitously. Where a school system implements a successful program to reduce gang conflict in the high schools, this is "news" by anyone's definition. And when a new technique for resolving parent-child conflict shows promise of working, even speculative reports on it will find an eager audience.

What some news organizations may fail to recognize is that people not only read or tune in the news for stimulation or "kicks" (the classic entertainment value factors), but also to

Can it be done in practice?
 Is reporting on conflict resolution a marketable concept?

GENERAL:

Questions for Reporters

relieve their anxieties. With general levels of fear and frustration rising throughout the industrialized world, there is a market (or so it seems to us) for stories featuring successful problem-solving and conflict resolution. Desperate people, as we know, often turn to charlatans, snake-oil salesmen, demagogues, and others who promise quick cures for their personal and social ills. Journalists can address these needs without becoming confidence-peddlers by describing genuine instances of conflict resolution and prevention: cases in which conflicts that might have become vicious and destructive were averted by addressing their causes.

The American public's interest in "How To..." remains unabated. How to build families that stay together, schools that teach, neighborhoods that prosper, and government institutions that serve are subjects that should find a ready market among the anxious consumers of news. Conflict sells -- but so does conflict resolution.

AN ILLUSTRATION:

In the aftermath of the Rodney King trial and the subsequent riots in Los Angeles, the Akron Beacon Journal in Ohio decided to do a series of articles on the poor state of race relations in their community. A survey confirmed the extent of the problem, and the editors decided to hire consultants to assist them in clarifying the views that African-Americans and whites had of each other by convening focus groups. When black and white focus groups were brought together to compare their views, the reporters were surprised and heartened by the strength of the participants' desires to communicate with each other.

As a result of this experience, the reporting team realized that their newspaper was in a position to play a facilitating role between the polarized community groups in Akron, and that this could be done without jeopardizing their journalistic integrity. The Beacon Journal obtained the services of two experienced facilitators and invited community groups to join in project "Coming Together." This led to an ongoing program of relationship-building activities between approximately 140 young people, religious groups, businesses, and other groups in the city. When the paper asked its readership to endorse the program, more than 22,000 did and got their names printed in the paper.

The journalists' assumption in this case was that more was needed than simply reporting the facts. Stepping somewhat out of their traditional role, they managed to set in motion a conflict

resolution process that itself became a rich source of news. The extent to which this process will be effective in changing the structure of race relations in Akron remains to be seen, but the potential for change seems to have been enhanced. The editors believe that this was accomplished without betraying journalistic values or surrendering their independence.

The Akron Beacon Journal, the original paper in the Knight-Ridder newspaper group, received the Pulitzer Award for Community Reporting for its efforts in reporting this conflict.

If things were only what they seemed to be, there would be no need for analysis. On its face, a conflict is simply a current event or series of events: "Dog Bites Man," "Abortion Foes Blockade Clinic," or "Serbs Bomb Sarajevo." But the confrontation that we see -- the newsmaking event -- has two hidden dimensions that are critical to an understanding of its real character and meaning.

The first dimension is historical. Every conflict is the outcome of a process that prepared the way for it, conceived it, and nurtured it in latent form long before it made the headlines. The public accusation, the lawsuit filed, the shot fired in anger ... these are the visible results of strained or broken relationships between conflicting parties. To understand the conflict, we need to know what the relationship was like before open hostilities erupted. What happened to strain or shatter it? What patterns of conflict emerged after that? What are the prospects that good relations can be restored or reconstructed? Those who do not inquire into a conflict's history will probably not understand it at all.

The second hidden dimension of conflict is systematic. Just as the struggle we see has roots in the past, it is

The Hidden Dimensions of Conflict

interconnected with present events and relationships in ways that are patterned, although they may not be readily apparent. While conspiracy theorists see connections everywhere, the more common tendency among journalists is to describe each conflict as isolated, like a boxing match fought in a spotlighted ring. But virtually every conflicted relationship is part of some contemporary system, some larger web of events and relations, that defines and maintains it. Exploring this systematic dimension is the second key to accurate and penetrating conflict analysis.

We focus first on the importance of the conflict's history. For without adequate exploration of this dimension, it is difficult to "frame" a conflict properly and to convey a sense of its true nature and scope. Imagine a reporter of long ago trying to describe the April 1775 attacks by Colonial militiamen on British troops at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts! Unless the journalist appreciated the century-long process that had turned the American colonies into communities with their own identities and interests, both quite separate from those of the British, he or she would be unable to say whether armed attacks by the Minutemen were the acts of a few unrepresentative "extremists" or the opening shots of a revolutionary war. And without taking into account the escalating pattern of conflict triggered by British colonial legislation, it would be impossible to assess the likelihood of other colonies joining the rebellion.

Similarly, it is historical analysis that enables a reporter to say which conflicting party, if either, should be considered the "aggressor." Those lacking an appreciation of a conflict's history often pin this label on the contestant whose hostile acts first attract public attention (in this case, the Minutemen might be so labeled). More often than not, however, uncovering the "story behind the story" changes one's understanding of the parties' relationship. In some cases, the apparent aggressor turns out upon analysis to be the actual "defender." In others, history makes it impossible to distinguish between aggressors and defenders. And in still others, it helps us to understand what (other than pure orneriness) motivated one party to attack the other, why the attack took the form it did, and what is likely to happen next.

Not only is this knowledge essential to accurate reporting on conflict, it is also the sine qua non for effective conflict resolution. By contrast, journalism that fails to put a struggle in historical perspective may actually help perpetuate it, since a conflict that seems to have no point of origin or describable causes will appear to have no possible end. Consider the way that some observers describe current ethnic conflicts. We have become used to reading or hearing about "primordial hatreds," "traditional enmities," "centuries-long hostility," and the like, as if violent conflicts were natural to certain groups, or as if these embittered relationships dated from time immemorial. But history demonstrates that most ethnic struggles in the modern era

are of relatively recent vintage, and that their active causes are also rooted in the conditions of modern life.

Until the breakup of former Yugoslavia, for example, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims frequently married into each other's families. Until the influx of refugees into Palestine during the Hitler era, Jews and Palestinians cohabited quite peacefully in the Holy Land. What disrupted these relationships were changes in the social environment, some fairly obvious and some more obscure. Analysis that explores the historical dimension can "derify" conflict by identifying these critical changes.

Once conflict starts, of course, there is a tendency on both sides to evoke a mythic history that demonstrates one side's timeless honesty, courage, and good will, and the other side's equally timeless deceitfulness and savagery. One recalls that Baruch Goldstein, the perpetrator of the 1994 Hebron Massacre, was in the habit of calling the Palestinians "Amelikites" -- the name of one of Israel's biblical foes -- thus perpetuating the myth of ancient enmity. Historically inquisitive journalism is the antidote to this sort of lethal mythmaking. The history of a relationship between individuals or groups almost always shows that violent conflict is a phase of the relationship, not a permanent feature of it. The same history demonstrates that the causes of the conflict are more complex and concrete than the inherent righteousness of one party or the hopeless sinfulness of the other. Finally, even without intending to prophesy, good historical analysis points to the future. It indicates what

inherited problems are continuing to generate conflict and (by implication) what future solutions might end it.

Exploring a conflict's historical roots is essential, but the journalist also has a second dimension to investigate: its systematic connections with events of the present. A few questions that may help to reveal these connections are these:

-- Who are the disputing parties? Are they only the people presently shouting or shooting at each other, or are other groups also implicated, either directly or indirectly?

-- What are the real issues driving the conflict? Are they limited to the issues or demands framed by the immediate parties, or are broader or deeper concerns involved?

-- Is the clash now attracting public attention all there is to the conflict, or is it an expression or reflection of some less obvious struggle?

It is only by asking such questions that our hypothetical reporter at the time of the American Revolution could discover, for example, that the local contest between American colonists and the British Crown was closely related to a much larger struggle between Great Britain and France for supremacy around the globe. Understanding this contemporary "conflict system," would also put the journalist in a position to predict French intervention, which proved to be decisive in the closing battles of the Revolution. Frequently it takes imagination, hard work, and a certain amount of chutzpah to expose the systematic aspects of some apparently isolated conflict. In covering crime stories,

for example, an established journalistic convention dictates that the story be framed as a dramatic conflict between individuals. The alleged perpetrator, surrounded by defense attorneys, friendly witnesses, and other allies, is pictured in desperate struggle against his accusers, with impartial, authoritative third parties (judges, juries, courts of appeal) holding the balance of power between the two sides. The story's conventional high points are the perpetrator's indictment, trial, and sentencing. Ordinarily, the proceedings concern serious crimes of violence or white collar offenses involving large amounts of money. Ordinarily, matters considered not germane to the issues of guilt or innocence, like the defendant's race, religion, and socioeconomic status, are downplayed or ignored.

The results of applying these conventions are serious: presenting these conflicts as isolated dramas conveys a radically false picture of crime and criminal justice in America. Journalists who cover the police and criminal court beats know that our criminal justice system is no longer dramatically adversarial, with impartial third parties exercising the balance of power in formal trial proceedings. It is administrative, often mechanically so, with prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges negotiating informal, uncontested pleas in well over 90% of all criminal cases that are ready for trial. They know, too, that the violent crimes covered most often by news media are dwarfed in volume by nonviolent and less serious offenses (petty thefts, minor drug transactions, etc.). And they understand that

the socioeconomic status of most criminal defendants, while legally irrelevant, is essential to any sensible understanding of the causes of crime and the incidence of punishment in the United States.

An illustration: For years, reporters covering prisoners on death row discussed issues of individual guilt or innocence and reported on details of the prisoners' personal lives without appearing to notice that white murderers were far less likely to be executed than blacks. Anti-death penalty lawyers later proved statistically what should have been apparent to common-sense observation: African-Americans were six to ten times more likely to be executed than whites who had committed identical or indistinguishable crimes. At length, this fact was put forward by some defense attorneys as a good reason to reverse death sentences in certain states, and when most courts refused to accept this argument, debate over it began in the U.S. Congress. Politics will decide how this matter is to be handled, and we express no opinion on it here. Our point is simply this: journalists who fail to put a conflict in social as well as historical context can unwittingly hide an important story.

But what does it mean to put a conflict in social and historical context? Aren't there as many "contexts" as there are opinions about society and history? When people talk about putting conflicts in context, aren't they advocating their theory and rejecting others that may be equally compelling, or more so? Faced with this multiplicity of views about the appropriate

context, it is no wonder that some journalists look back with nostalgia to a more traditional definition of their role: the reporter as an objective observer and describer of "facts." For them, we have both bad news and good news.

The bad news: Facts, or at least our perception of them, change as their context changes. So long as a death row prisoner's race was considered irrelevant, apparent discrimination against African-Americans in issuing execution orders was not a perceptible fact. Now that it has become perceptible, it is ineluctable: a fact that forces itself on one's attention, and that must be dealt with one way or another. There is simply no way one can escape the need to put conflicts in context.

The good news: There are not an infinite number of contexts to consider. True, what one considers an appropriate context will vary with one's theory of the role played by conflict in history and society. But conflict analysts have come to rely on certain theories in particular -- certain paradigms or comprehensive pictures of conflict in society -- that have proven useful in interpreting and resolving serious intergroup conflicts. After discussing the need for such theories in more detail, this handbook presents a number of them for consideration.

Theorizing is something that academics, in particular, are supposed to do. But everyone who thinks and writes about human conflict, including even the most objective observer, views events through the lenses of his or her own preconceptions, assumptions, and expectations. These intellectual frameworks shape our understanding of events, determining how we "see" them. Like the character in Moliere's play who suddenly realized that he had been speaking prose all his life, we are all conflict theorists to some extent, although our perspectives may not be all that conscious or coherent.

Suppose that a shootout involving the members of two ethnic groups takes place in a major city. Should this be considered an individual incident, or is it symptomatic of a broader conflict, for example, an ethnic or communal war? Who are the real parties to the dispute and what are their motives? What is causing the conflict, and what is the appropriate social context in which to interpret it? Is it likely to escalate, deescalate, or remain at current levels? What methods of suppressing or resolving it are most likely to succeed? Answering such questions takes us beyond the realm of common sense into that of interpretation, an activity requiring both practical and theoretical skills.

There are still many journalists who reject the role of interpreter, perhaps because it suggests bias or subjectivity on the part of the reporter. Like Detective Joe Friday on the old

Dragnet series, they claim to be interested only in "the facts, Ma'am." But observing and reporting is always an active, creative, interpretive enterprise. Making sense of events (scanning, framing, selecting, chronologizing, categorizing, comparing, evaluating, and predicting) means working over data in accordance with some vision or paradigm, some map of reality, that is already in the mind. There is a difference between biased reporting -- for example, refusing to take a source seriously because of personal prejudice -- and what one might call framed or located reporting. The inevitable "angle of vision" that frames and colors observation is produced by the assumptions and models that are part of every observer's mental equipment. We are all located somewhere.

Two situations, therefore, are almost guaranteed to get professional observers, journalists and academics alike, into trouble. The first is when the intellectual framework that they are using is unconscious, so that they think they are apprehending reality "objectively," without any distortion. The second is when they are unaware of alternative reality-maps that might make more sense of the events they are describing than the one they are using. If a reporter interprets events in the light of an inappropriate paradigm, the result is likely to be a distorted image, or even the disappearance of an important story.

A good illustration of these principles is the case of the Woodlawn fires. Woodlawn is an impoverished urban neighborhood, inhabited mainly by African-Americans, on Chicago's South Side.

Once, when there were industries nearby generating jobs, it was quite a decent place to live, attracting thousands of black people from southern states and from Chicago's port of entry, the west side. But the industries failed, the population continued to grow, and despite a thriving storefront and street life, the neighborhood sank slowly into poverty.

Naturally, along with a steady increase in joblessness, family breakups, school dropouts, sickness, substance abuse, street crime, and gang activity, there were residential fires. Lots of fires. Throughout the 1960s, Chicago reporters covered these events in conventional fashion. They reported each fire separately, like each robbery or gang shootout. The tone of the coverage was humdrum; reports of burned out slum dwellings were seldom front page items. Sometimes there was a "story": a child dead, a heroic fireman, a careless smoker, or a suspicion of arson. But the fires themselves were not considered a story. They were part of the scenery, so to speak, as collectively invisible as the trains roaring over one's head on the 63rd Street El.

This invisibility was a result of the reporters' "vision" of the ghetto -- the mental map that defined neighborhoods like Woodlawn for them and for most other people. This paradigm included a high rate of residential fires. Being burned out was one of the burdens borne by the poor, like being evicted, robbed, or shot at. Fire was seen as an inevitable feature of life in a poor black community, as natural to the ghetto as floods to a

riverbank town. The general tendency was, therefore, to consider them "acts of God." Why were there so many fires in Woodlawn? The answers seemed too obvious even to think about. They included ramshackle, deteriorating buildings; recalcitrant landlords; overworked firefighters; and fire inspectors on the take. Some residents were too young, too old, or too high to be careful with lighted matches and cigarettes; others used dangerous portable heaters or kept their stoves turned on against the harsh winters. Wiring was defective. Gas lines leaked. And, of course, there was always arson. How many fires were there in Woodlawn? Obviously, a great many -- but the prevailing paradigm suggested that as the rate of general neighborhood decline increased, so, obviously, would the rate of residential fires. Why bother to count?

So it went until the late 1960s, when several Chicago reporters, egged on by community activists connected with The Woodlawn Organization, began to count the fires and to question their origin. Their articles moved toward the front of their papers until headlines appeared: "Is Woodlawn Burning?" For the first time, residential fires in the inner city were perceived collectively as a "rash" or "plague" rather than a series of unconnected events. And for the first time, observers noted that the rate of conflagration in that community was too high to be explained by the usual paradigm of ghetto life. Attention centered, in particular, on absentee landlords who, unable to operate their properties at a profit, were rumored to be burning

them for the insurance proceeds. The reporters conducted their own investigations. Official investigations followed, and events that had been previously ignored or dismissed as inevitable acts of God were shown, at least in part, to have been avoidable acts of man.

What had made the difference in this coverage? An old map of reality, largely unconscious, had been challenged and at least partially supplanted by a new one. The old paradigm had not only stressed the inevitability of victimizing events like fires, muggings, and poverty-related illnesses in poor communities, it made either the victims themselves or unalterable circumstances responsible for their occurrence. Like all paradigms, furthermore, it contained emotional as well as intellectual features. Those using it felt detached sympathy for individual victims ("Too bad little Johnny died in that tenement fire"), mixed with anger or impatience at the community as a whole ("Why weren't Johnny's parents home? How can those people live like that?"), and a large dose of shoulder-shrugging resignation ("The poor are always with us"). The new paradigm, by contrast, saw the people of Woodlawn caught in a trap set by others. It envisioned the ghetto, with all its problems, as a historical creation, a state of affairs that had come into existence fairly recently, and which powerful groups outside the community (landlords, businessmen, politicians) were primarily responsible for maintaining.

This new reality-map did not spring spontaneously from the minds of the reporters covering the Woodlawn fires; it came out of the civil rights and Black Power movements, agitation by the New Left, the women's rights, welfare rights, and community organization movements...in short, out of the intense intellectual ferment and social upheaval that had made Chicago a cauldron of change in the mid- to late-1960s. The new framework saw the ghetto, essentially, as a prison without walls for poor African-Americans. Its emotional content combined strong sympathy for neighborhood residents with rage against the outside elite that was thought to be profiting from their misery. Of course, the new paradigm might contain its own blinders. It might tend to picture poor people as hopeless victims lacking all power of choice or will to self-improvement. Or it might focus attention exclusively on landlords or other local "conspirators" without considering the larger economic forces that, by impoverishing the community, had also made the landlords' position untenable. But one thing seems clear. Whatever their defects, the theoretical "lenses" used by the reporters enabled them to see a story that had been invisible to others.

General and Specific Models of Conflict

Two questions, then, will commend themselves to thoughtful journalists and other professional conflict analysts. First, how

can I become conscious of the theoretical framework or combination of frameworks that I am using? Second, what other useful frameworks might bring an invisible story into focus or put a different slant on the story that I am covering?

Consider the theoretical frameworks that come into play when a journalist covers a story about social conflict. In the first place, there are general frameworks or paradigms that describe and explain conflict: composite maps of human nature and society, formed by one's experience, social position, convictions, and culture, that strongly influence how one "sees" human conflict. Some people's background and experience, for example, incline them to embrace a vision of individuals as naturally competitive and aggressive, their hostile impulses held in check (if at all) by a system of punishments and rewards. Others tend to view their subjects as essentially peaceful and cooperative -- as social beings driven to commit hostile or antisocial acts by circumstances not of their own making. Often, the application of one paradigm or the other is triggered by an us/them distinction: people like "us" are naturally peaceful, while "they" are aggressive by nature. For example, a journalist used to covering the police beat who is assigned to cover an outbreak of urban rioting may well "see" the violence primarily as aggressive criminal behavior rather than as a form of protest.

In addition to general paradigms, which are discussed in more detail later on, the journalist's mental arsenal contains specific models that describe and explain particular types of

conflict. Every reporter will have in mind some image of a family dispute, a gang war, an environmental dispute, race riot, student protest, trade war, and so forth. These conflict models are often far richer and more detailed than one might think, indicating not only the probable parties to the conflict, but their usual intentions, the likely shape and dynamics of the struggle, the modes of resolution or termination possible, and the likely outcomes. Identifying a conflict as a "revolution," for example, implies that people have risen en masse against their government and that a change of political system is possible, whereas calling it a "coup" implies extralegal action by a small group to replace another group in power. "Gang war" conjures up the image of criminal organizations or groups of alienated youths fighting to control urban "turf" or to prove their manhood, while "ethnic conflict" or "communal war" adds a political dimension. It means that the "gangs" in conflict represent their people, and that the outcome of their struggle is likely to alter the balance of power.

Frequently, the conflict model adopted reflects the observer's political commitments. To the Truman administration, for example, the Korean War was a "police action," a term that called attention to North Korea's outlaw status in the eyes of the United Nations, as well as obviating the need for a declaration of war by the U.S. Congress. To the Soviets and Chinese, the same conflict was not only a war, but an unjustified "imperialist war."

Despite the possibilities of their political abuse, however, specific paradigms of conflict are both necessary and useful. To begin with, they enable observers to distinguish between types of conflict. If the reporter sent to cover an urban riot possesses a well-developed framework for describing and explaining this type of civil disorder, he or she may ask questions that a police reporter would be unlikely to pose. Specific paradigms also permit us to relate one type of conflict causally to another. Journalists reporting on a racial disorder, for example, will want to inquire into the relationship between the police and the minority community prior to the riot. Finally, conflict models sometimes reveal unexpected similarities between events widely separated in time and space. Reporters seeking to explain why rioters in Los Angeles attacked Asian-owned shops, for example, would do well to understand the conditions that have made "middleman minority" groups targets of violence around the globe.

At the same time, as the case of the Woodlawn fires reveals, the use of an inadequate or poorly chosen paradigm can make the real story "disappear." Covering conflict situations poses particularly tricky problems in this regard, since, either through ignorance or a desire to mislead (and sometimes through a combination of both), the parties to the conflict frequently misunderstand or misrepresent its true nature. A bank robber may wish himself presented as a Robin Hood. A handful of protestors may believe that they speak for a mass movement. Governments frequently claim that what they call "police actions" or

"peacekeeping missions" are not wars. And ethnic groups battling over legal rights or territory may really be fighting to defend more intangible interests, for example, their group identity or need for dignified treatment.

Of course, those most directly embroiled in conflict are essential sources. Journalists who attempt to cover conflict situations by interviewing allegedly "impartial" outsiders do so at their peril. But the parties' own subjectivity, as well as their desire to influence opinion favorably, often leads them to try to activate a misleading paradigm in the mind of the reporter or news analyst. Those reporting on conflict are particularly apt to be misled when they are unaware of a paradigm to which they are already committed, or -- the other side of the same coin -- when they are not conscious of other frameworks that might be more useful and illuminating in covering a particular story.

These two problems are obviously related, since it is very difficult to uncover one's own assumptions ("What framework am I using to interpret this conflict?") without being aware of the range of possible alternatives ("What other frameworks are available?").

As the following chapters demonstrate, there are almost always alternative methods of framing a conflict that can be "tried out" before committing oneself to a particular approach. Unfortunately, the price to be paid for failing to question one's own paradigm can be high. An example is the way in which both journalists and academic analysts interpreted (or misinterpreted)

the events of June 1989 in Beijing. During the late spring of 1989, world attention focused on Tiananmen Square, where Chinese students were holding unprecedented demonstrations criticizing the Chinese government and demanding democratic reforms. Many of the students had close ties to China's ruling elite; several of their leaders had studied in the United States; and they insisted in interviews that their intention was not to overthrow the government, but simply to open up the Chinese system to wider participation. The specific model of conflict that this activated or confirmed in the minds of most Western journalists was the model of student protest.

The reporters and news commentators on the scene generally interpreted the students' "democracy movement" as a peaceful, reform-minded protest roughly analogous to the American student movement of the 1960s, and bearing some relationship to the pro-democracy movements then being led by intellectuals in several Eastern European countries. This framework was consistent not only with what the student leaders were saying, but also with the reporters' own theoretical preconceptions, formed on the basis of their previous experience and cultural understandings.

Therefore, when the tanks and armored personnel carriers of the People's Liberation Army rolled into Tiananmen Square, to be confronted by protesters brandishing pictures of Mao Tse-tung and throwing firebombs, the shock was enormous. Both sides were behaving far more violently than had been expected. Some reporters described the events in Tiananmen as a "massacre" by

the army. But, days later, it became apparent that a violent upheaval of far greater proportions had taken place in working class neighborhoods outside the city center, where masses of insurgents supported by mutinous units of the PLA had risen against the army and had been brutally suppressed.

The story missed by most Western journalists (and by most academic analysts as well) was the existence of a highly explosive, potentially revolutionary situation in Beijing, Shanghai, and other Chinese cities where working-class discontent was running high. The focus on student protest, perceived as a relatively familiar type of youthful demand for recognition and a greater voice in decision making, grossly understated the militancy of the student protestors, many of whom died with the Communist hymn, the "Internationale," on their lips. More important, it ignored the social divisions and mass discontent that inclined the Chinese government to consider their activities a real threat to the existence of the regime. As a result, the reporters (and their readers or viewers) were stunned both by the violence of the government's response, which they perceived as an "over-reaction," and by the protestors' willingness to kill and be killed in defense of their cause.

Was the model of social revolution, then, the correct framework for interpreting the uprising in China? Even now this is not clear; five years after the event, academic analysts are still debating the issue. Quite often, after the smoke of battle clears, those analyzing a particular conflict discover that no

existing paradigm entirely fits the events under discussion. (For example, while the Los Angeles Riot of 1992 conformed in some respects to the "race riot" pattern established in America during the 1960s, in other ways it clearly did not.) But the point, in any case, is not to discover the "correct" conflict model; it is to use the best models available to illuminate events. If those reporting on China's pro-democracy movement had tried out the framework of social revolution -- if they had inquired about the state of mind of Chinese workers in the spring of 1989 -- their interpretation of the summer's events would have been deepened.

Whatever conflict they are interpreting, therefore, journalists need to have in mind a range of potentially applicable frameworks, a checklist of useful conflict theories, that will help them to bring particular conflicts into focus and to avoid distorting or missing the real story. This handbook is intended to provide such a checklist, as well as to provide a review of relevant frameworks for understanding conflict management and resolution.

But several preliminary warnings are in order:

-- First, the frameworks discussed below are sketched in brief outline. Readers wishing to deepen their understanding of conflict theory should refer to the works cited in the Appendix. This short guide is intended to inspire further thinking and

reading; it is no substitute for a program of study in conflict analysis.

-- Second, the theories presented here reflect the interests of some conflict scholars in analyzing and resolving deep-rooted social conflicts, as opposed to ordinary commercial disputes, legislative negotiations, and other disputes customarily settled by applying generally accepted principles of law, politics, or morality. Those interested in theories applicable to these "consensual" conflicts should consult the Appendix for further reading suggestions.

-- All paradigms of conflict should be analyzed critically and tested in the crucible of events. Academic experts, on the whole, are in no position to preach to journalists; in the whirlwind of history, their theories have often proven inadequate. How many scholars were able to predict the collapse of Soviet Communism, the global proliferation of ethnic conflict, the wave of religious fundamentalism now sweeping the globe, or the plague of crime and racial violence now afflicting major cities in the West? How many can make sense of these phenomena even now? This failure to foresee and to account for important outbreaks of social conflict suggests that the general theory of conflict most widely accepted in the West -- the paradigm of bargainable interest -- is more limited than many scholars had thought.

We begin our discussion of general conflict theories with a critical look at the bargaining/compromise framework. Then we go

describe themselves in terms meant to suggest mass support for desires, and needs. If their protest is violent, they frequently suggest that their actions are representative of mass interests, the language used by people challenging authority is meant to "criminal outbreak," "terrorist conspiracy," etc. Contrariwise, or revolution, official spokesmen often call it a "riot," serious. Instead of characterizing a violent protest as a revolt involving them is therefore not deep-rooted or politically not representative of broader groups, and that the conflict suggesting that individuals or groups challenging their power are Those in positions of authority frequently use language

AN ILLUSTRATION:

appear?
to deepen coverage of the conflict and make "invisible" stories embraced by the speaker? How can the reporter use this knowledge general or specific frameworks of conflict interpretation
How does the language used to describe a conflict reveal the

GENERAL:

Questions for Reporters

on to consider several alternative theories that journalists may find more useful in interpreting serious conflict situations.

their cause, for example, as "soldiers," "commandos,"
 "revolutionaries," or "patriotic fighters."
 Instead of taking any party's conflict model at face value,
 the reporter can question it. An independent inquiry will raise
 questions such as: Are those who engage in violent activity
 acting for themselves, or do they represent others? If so, whom
 do they represent? Do their sympathizers give them passive or
 active support? Are these supporters effectively isolated, or
 are they linked with mass groups, and, if so, how? Even partial
 answers will enable the reporter to distinguish between a mass-
 based movement using riotous or terrorist methods (for example,
 Algeria's National Salvation Front) and a violent group isolated
 from its purported mass base (for example, the American Ku Klux
 Klan). This independent paradigm, in turn, can provide a context
 in which to interpret individual "incidents" of violence by or
 against a regime. It also lays the groundwork for evaluation of
 the likely duration of the conflict, the relative strength of the
 conflicting parties, and the probable effectiveness of attempts
 to suppress the violence by force.

III. BARGAINABLE INTERESTS AND MODERNIZATION

General theories of conflict influence how we perceive a wide range of conflict situations, from family disputes and crime waves to revolutions and wars. Most of them combine a model of human nature with a perspective on social organization, often focusing on the connection -- the "match" or "mismatch" -- between the two. Almost by definition, theories of conflict emphasize the mismatch between individual wants or needs and the way that social institutions are structured. "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains," declares Rousseau. "Individuals are subordinated to social production, which exists externally to them, as a sort of fate," says Marx. "It is impossible," Freud asserts, "to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct...."

The notion of mismatch permits a wide range of variations. Some theorists focus strongly on the human factor, arguing that people's aggressivity, their expectations, or the power of their basic needs makes them difficult to "civilize" or to dominate. Others pay more attention to specific forms of social organization, emphasizing the role played by institutional change (either overly rapid or too slow) in fomenting social conflict. Two further distinctions cut across these lines. The disjunction between individuals and social institutions can be viewed either as relatively minor or as severe, and either as temporary or

permanent. Theories of "minor mismatch" imply that social conflicts can be settled (temporarily, at least) by a process of adjustment or compromise, while theories of "severe mismatch" imply that some basic reconstruction either of personalities or social institutions will be required to terminate them. And while "temporary mismatch" frameworks suggest the possibility of conflict resolution, a "permanent mismatch" means that conflict management is the best that one can hope for.

We have chosen six conflict frameworks for brief description in this book. The first, the paradigm of bargainable interests, is a theory of conflict management, reflecting assumptions about human nature and social organization accepted by many Western social scientists and journalists. It has been supplemented in recent years by the framework of modernization, which offers to explain the prevalence of unmanageable conflict in non-Western societies. Two newer theories, the paradigms of basic human needs and of relative deprivation, reframe the individual/institutional mismatch in ways that suggest methods of resolving, not just managing, serious social conflicts. And two final frameworks, focusing on class struggle and culture struggle, raise the specter of future conflicts unresolvable by peaceful means. These frameworks may seem incompatible at first (a case of conflicting conflict theories). But we will see, as the discussion proceeds, that they can sometimes be used in combination to fill in each other's gaps or to correct other weaknesses. Journalists reviewing this material may want to ask

themselves which of these theories they have already used in reporting or commenting on conflict situations, and which seem most likely to generate better coverage in the future.

Bargainable Interests

The general framework used by most Western scholars and journalists to comprehend human conflict is based on their own experience as participants in a developed liberal capitalist society. It pictures people as driven by powerful individual desires for material advancement, pleasure, status, and power. Since these desires are thought of as insatiable, while the means of satisfying them are limited, conflict within this framework is considered natural and inevitable: that is to say, it cannot be permanently resolved. On the other hand, the mismatch between human nature and social institutions is not considered severe; it can be managed. In the public arena, where people form groups to work toward achievement of their goals, individual desires are reframed as "interests," and group conflict takes the form of a conflict of interests. Such conflicts can be managed in three ways: either by negotiation, by acceptance of authoritative legal rules, or, as a last resort, by coercion.

The system of conflict management envisaged by this paradigm is triple-tiered. Negotiation, the first level of the system, is the normal way of resolving interest-based disputes. Buyers and

sellers negotiate prices and other terms of trade; workers and management engage in individual or collective bargaining; political parties and "interest groups" regularly negotiate public policy differences; and the nation as a whole bargains both with allies and with adversaries. The range of issues considered bargainable within this framework is very wide -- perhaps even unlimited. Thus, church groups negotiate theological differences, parents bargain over the custody of their children, and even divisive "social issues" (for example, the status of homosexuals in the armed forces) are subject to political bargaining.

Legal processes establish the rules governing the major forms of interest-based negotiation and provide for the settlement of disputes not bargained successfully to a conclusion. Compared with most negotiation processes, those prescribed by law are formal, ensuring consistency of results; public, ensuring accountability by the authorities; and authoritative, ensuring public obedience. This second tier of the system is operated by a public authority that most people view as legitimate and worthy to be obeyed even if it does not satisfy their interests in particular cases. Although it rests ultimately on the force of the state, its effectiveness overall depends upon popular consent.

Coercion, the third level of the system, is available when negotiation and legal processes fail to settle disputes or when a conflict falls outside the ambit of effective systems of

negotiation and law. Wielded by the public authority (or, within limits set by law, by private parties), coercion is used to compel obedience by lawbreakers and those who deny the public authority's legitimacy. It is also used to punish or deter those outside the system who threaten the "vital interests" of those inside it: for example, international aggressors.

Looking more closely at this theory, one can recognize its optimistic and pessimistic implications. On the optimistic side, individuals are viewed as rational, self-interested, pleasure-seeking beings who habitually calculate the costs and benefits of their actions. As a result, most of their disputes can be settled by private or public bargaining. (Indeed, the urge to establish free markets for commercial bargaining and democratic states for political bargaining is the primary collective impulse recognized by the framework.) A related implication is that rational people will understand the need for a "social contract" establishing legal boundaries for negotiation and legal methods of managing unsettled conflicts. This consensus supporting the rule of law makes both bargaining and legal processes effective and minimizes the need for brute force.

The pessimistic implications of the framework are less obvious, but, if anything, more profound. In theory, coercion is a last resort, to be applied only when people are unable or unwilling to negotiate, legislate, or litigate out their differences. But in practice, coercive power enters into every form of conflict management. This is a result of considering

people bundles of allied or competing interests rather than social beings linked or bonded in some essential way. Even when the disputing parties share common values and loyalties, negotiation is always "from strength." The relative power of the parties determines the outcome of most negotiations, whether public or private. Normal political bargaining empowers the strongest interest groups, and even "pure" democratic politics crystallize the power of the majority over the minority. Perhaps for this reason, obedience to law seems increasingly to depend upon coercion by the state.

Most important, when people do not act like the rational, malleable self-seekers of this theory -- when they break laws, challenge majority rule, refuse negotiations, or act "non-economically" -- they must be dealt with by force. To put this another way, conflicts are manageable, according to this paradigm, because they are conflicts of interest. Interests, by definition, are bargainable: one party gets a little more, the other gets a little less, and everyone is free to renegotiate another day. But what happens when the subject of the dispute is the life of an unborn child or a woman's desire to terminate her pregnancy? How is conflict managed when one group has virtually no bargaining power, or when a group monopolizing power is considered hopelessly incompetent or corrupt? How, in short, does the paradigm deal with conflicts that are not interest-based?

The short answer is that those committed to the bargainable interests framework (including most Western decision-makers) have no method of resolving these conflicts peacefully. In theory, law is available to settle even intense and intractable disputes. But where people disagree very strongly about matters they consider non-negotiable, they will twist the law to serve their ends, or simply break it. Law as an effective, nonviolent method of conflict management depends upon consensus: an overarching agreement on applicable moral and legal norms. Unless the parties agree on these fundamental principles and procedures, legal rules can be enforced only at gunpoint. Unfortunately, where conflict reaches a high enough level of intensity, consensus (if it ever existed) tends to collapse. Those trying to prop it up may make last-ditch efforts to gain voluntary adherence through crash educational or publicity campaigns (example: "Just Say No" to drugs). But coercion, the "last resort" where bargainable interests are concerned, tends to become the normal method of dealing with high-intensity, non-negotiable conflicts.

Is coercion an effective method of resolving such disputes? Here the paradigm becomes misleading, for it assumes that most people will be self-seeking enough to modify their behavior when threatened with sufficient pain. If social sanctions are not enough to prevent misbehavior, we can up the ante by imposing fines or imprisonment; if these are insufficient, then corporal or capital punishment will deter potential outlaws. But many of

those involved in high-intensity conflicts have already rejected this utilitarian calculus. Driven by hope, need, ideological commitment, or sheer indifference to their fate, they frequently refuse to alter their behavior even when faced by overwhelming force or offered substantial rewards for compliance. This we find mystifying. Why won't these diehards face facts? Why don't they respond rationally to threats and cajolery? Often, we label them "crazies," "fanatics," "cultists," "hard-core criminals" and so forth. But this name-calling is evidence of what one might call the hole in the paradigm. It is a tacit confession that certain forms of conflict are not comprehensible or manageable within the framework of bargainable interest.

Given the pervasiveness of this framework in Western (and especially American) thinking, it is not hard to see why we are baffled by the religious conflicts now shaking much of the world, or why we find it difficult to account for the persistence and viciousness of struggles between ethnic and racial groups both at home and abroad. The limitations of this paradigm raise the major questions that other conflict theories will attempt to answer. How can we explain the causes and dynamics of conflicts not based on bargainable interests? What are the prospects for managing or resolving these violent struggles? What new forms of conflict can be expected to erupt in an increasingly turbulent and unpredictable world -- and what can be done about them?

GENERAL:

Suppose that one party to a conflict presents an opposing

party with a list of "non-negotiable" demands or breaks off

negotiations in midstream. Can this be interpreted as a

bargaining stratagem or ploy? Is it evidence of the recalcitrant

party's fanaticism or unreasonableness? Will either coercion or

concessions bring the walkout back to the negotiating table?

AN ILLUSTRATION:

In interpreting negotiating behavior, it helps to know

whether or not the paradigm of bargainable interest is applicable

to the conflict at issue. If the parties are negotiating within

an accepted framework of legal rules and customs (if, say, a

labor union and a company are bargaining in the usual way over

wages and working conditions), breaking off negotiations or

presenting non-negotiable demands may well be a bargaining ploy.

But if bargaining raises issues that one or both parties consider

non-negotiable (for example, if the existence of the company or

the union is at stake), a refusal to bargain may signal that

vital interests, or basic needs and values transcending immediate

economic interests, are perceived as threatened.

Of course, people sometimes act unreasonably or fanatically.

On the other hand, apparent fanaticism on the part of a party to

conflict frequently indicates the presence of issues considered

too sensitive or important to be submitted to power-based negotiation. If the issues are basic enough, neither coercion nor concessions may be effective to compel a resumption of negotiations. The United States government, for example, refused to negotiate with Iraq after the latter's invasion of Kuwait, even though Iraq offered to withdraw in exchange for apparently minor concessions. Considering that the U.S. was clearly the more powerful party, some considered this evidence of American fanaticism or of personal animosity between President Bush and Saddam Hussein. But the U.S. government chose force in the belief that its own vital interests and those of its regional allies depended upon destroying Iraq's capacity to wage interstate war.

Quite commonly, the weaker party refuses negotiations or breaks them off out of fear that its vital interests or basic needs will be compromised. Considering that it is the weaker party, this behavior may seem irrational or even suicidal. But since power-based negotiations generally confirm the superiority of the stronger party, it may not be irrational for the weaker contestant to take its chances on the more unpredictable terrain of, say, low-intensity warfare or the politics of the street.

Modernization

In the decades following World War II, unanticipated conflicts such as the Chinese Revolution, the Cold War, and a wave of anti-colonial revolts in the Third World led many policymakers and social scientists to question the universality of Western methods of comprehending and managing conflict. What seemed most relevant to them was the difference between modern capitalist societies, where social conflicts were generally managed by negotiation within the rule of law, and less-developed or non-capitalist societies, where such conflicts produced either revolutionary explosions or manifestations of state terror. This distinction became the basis of the framework of modernization.

According to this paradigm, all societies move from a traditional state through a transitional period to a state of modernity. In the advanced capitalist societies of the West and Japan, this process, which took place over several centuries, has been largely completed. Other societies can be classified as late-transitional or nearly modernized (Argentina, Brazil, Russia), midway in the transition to modernity (India, China, Algeria), or early-transitional (Angola, Sudan, Cambodia). In both traditional and modern societies, conflicts are managed in accordance with norms of custom, morality, and law that are accepted by the vast majority of people. In the transitional phase, however, society is disorganized, competing groups do not share common values, and social conflict tends to be

unmanageable. Mass violence is therefore considered "a disease of the transition."

Traditional societies, in this framework, are those governed primarily by settled custom. Economically, they are based on subsistence agriculture, nomadism, or hunting and gathering. Socially, they feature extended families and clans, with clearly defined rules governing family roles, personal relationships, duties towards strangers, and so forth. Property rights, closely linked to kin-group relations, are defined by the same set of customary rules, as interpreted by elders or others authorized to interpret them. Political organization is local; religion is inherited along with membership in one's ethnic group; contacts with outsiders are limited; and one's culture is the culture of the village, clan, or tribe.

Transitional societies are those in which the way of life based on custom is changing radically and in which traditional authority is breaking down. For any number of reasons -- but frequently as a result of the impact of colonialism -- people in rapidly changing societies find themselves "sprung loose" from traditional occupations, family roles, patterns of behavior, and relationships with authorities. The process is extremely painful, generating both resistance to change and a desperate search for a more just and rewarding social existence. Villagers move to the cities, seeking jobs and opportunities for advancement, or they hire out for wages in the countryside. Increasing contact with members of other groups redefines their

personal roles, ambitions, and group affiliations. In time, they become available for mobilization by ethnic organizations, labor unions, political parties, and other groups seeking to reorganize society along more modern lines. But in the society at large, there is vast disagreement about the pace, methods, and aims of modernization. At this stage, the theory suggests, social conflict is least manageable. On the one hand, traditional roles and restraints no longer bind people to customary ways of thinking and acting. On the other, tradition has not yet been replaced by law, or tribal loyalties by national loyalty. Local markets are not integrated into national or international markets, nor have local political organizations become part of an established state apparatus. In short, the preconditions for conflict management are not yet present. People do not consider themselves individuals with bargainable interests that can be aggregated and represented by broad-based interest groups. On the contrary, every dispute seems to present qualitative, either/or issues. Either our tribe will rule, or theirs will. Either the city or the country will dominate. Society will be either elitist or democratic, socialist or capitalist, foreign-controlled or independent....The transition, then, is the phase of revolutions, coups, communal bloodletting, and wars of secession. It is the point at which people are most highly politicized and political issues most highly personalized. Since modern methods of conflict management have not been developed,

the theory suggests that little can be done to manage (much less resolve) these conflicts.

Modern societies, finally, are those which have successfully negotiated the transition to a stable, integrated system allowing continuous economic, political, and cultural development within a framework of accepted legal and moral norms. The paradigm assumes that modernization ends with the creation of modern Western society and its characteristic methods of conflict management, and that, in this sense, the triumph of modern capitalism means the "end of history." Some theorists now suggest that the advanced capitalist states have entered a "post-industrial" or "postmodern" phase in which large-scale, top-down systems are being replaced by more fluid and decentralized decision-making processes. If so, this would help to explain the popularity in some Western nations of the alternative dispute resolution processes described in Chapter VI of this handbook. In any case, the modernization process ends with conflicts being managed by the methods of negotiation, law, and "last resort" coercion. We come back at the "end of history" to the paradigm of bargainable interest.

For the journalist, the chief advantage of the modernization framework is the distinction that it makes between ideological claims and socioeconomic realities. For example, although both the Soviet Union and China claimed to be "post-capitalist" societies, modernization theory saw both nations driven by the need to catch up with more advanced industrial societies. By

implication, the more modern the Second World became, the more it would tend to resemble the First World -- a process of convergence at odds with both totalitarian controls and radical social experiments like China's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." And similarly, while apparently conservative leaders like the current rulers of Iran may claim to be the defenders of tradition, the paradigm suggests that ancient customs are bound to be eaten away and transformed by the inevitable (and holistic) process of modernization. Those using the modernization framework tend to be skeptical about the ability of any religiously or culturally conservative leadership to arrest or control the development of science and industry, commercialism, democratization, secularism, women's rights, and so forth.

But is this skepticism justified? This may be a good point at which to mention several limitations of the theory. First, the modernization process is often considered to be unidirectional, leading inevitably to the creation of Western-style social and political systems. The possibility that a nation like Iran might turn its back on the West, that it might attempt to develop independently under the aegis of traditional religious authorities, did not occur to many modernization theorists or to policymakers using this framework. Nor did they anticipate other apparently anti-modern developments like the Islamic revolt in the Sunni Muslim world, the wave of Hindu revivalism sweeping India, or the revival of ethnic passions and

communal warfare in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. Germany under Nazi rule was a modern state. This alone should have suggested that "modernity" might take forms very unlike those defining most current Western social systems.

Second, if the process is not unidirectional, and if it can produce social institutions unlike those of the contemporary West, it becomes difficult -- perhaps impossible -- to rank existing societies on a meaningful scale of modernization. Suppose, for example, that a state like Bosnia is reorganized on the basis of independent "mini-states" representing the Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim peoples, and that these mini-states find a way to live peacefully together. Should this development be considered anti-modern? Transitional? A new form of modernity? Once "modernization" has been decoupled from "Westernization," the framework yields few answers to such questions.

Third, since the framework assumes that the modern capitalist order represents the end of history, it leaves a number of vital questions unanswered. For example: How do we explain the persistence of relatively unmanageable conflicts (crime waves, racial/ethnic struggles, and moral or religious disputes) in modern Western societies? Why does the degree of coercion in these societies, as opposed to voluntary obedience to social and legal norms, appear to be increasing? Are modern nations capable of financing their continued modernization? Can the modernization process be reversed? And if so, with what results? Despite its strengths, the theory's focus on less-

developed societies sheds little light on our own society, on forms of conflict common to all human societies, or on conflicts that may be gestating even now in the advanced industrial nations.

Questions for Reporters

GENERAL:

How can a journalist assess the role played by modernization in generating a violent social conflict? How can he or she use this knowledge to shed new light on the conflict being reported?

AN ILLUSTRATION:

Theorists recognize a number of key indicators of modernization; including rates of rural-to-urban migration, intermarriage between members of differing ethnic groups, capital formation, and political mobilization; but one of the most telling is the rate at which young people are incorporated and retained in the educational system. Severe conflict may occur when the number of students in secondary schools and universities rises rapidly in a society not yet equipped to offer them gainful or meaningful employment. Under these circumstances, young intellectuals often seek to lead mass movements to change the prevailing system. Failing this, they may "go it alone" as members or supporters of terrorist or guerrilla organizations.

The keenest observers of Latin American and European urban guerrilla groups of the late 1960s and early 1970s noted the massive increase in secondary school and college populations in the nations most affected by this type of conflict, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Italy, in the years prior to these revolts. These analysts understood that, despite their rhetoric, the young militants were not products of Soviet or Cuban "subversion" but of conditions generated by the partial and uneven modernization of their own societies. They were also able to predict that, since most of these groups were not closely linked to larger, mass-based organizations, they would be highly vulnerable to military suppression.

Alert journalists will also want to be aware of the possibilities of "reverse modernization" presented when developed industrial societies suffer severe long-term economic reverses (for example, as the result of war, revolution, or global market competition). Do such societies move back into an earlier "transitional" phase, with its higher levels of conflict, political mobilization, and instability? This theoretical territory is largely uncharted, but those interested in the question are keeping a careful eye on nations like Russia, Great Britain, and even the United States.

Perhaps the most ambitious new theory aimed at explaining deep-rooted conflict is the paradigm of basic human needs. According to proponents of this theory, the principal source of long-term, violent social conflict is the failure of existing social and political systems to satisfy fundamental individual needs, such as the needs for identity, recognition, bonding, security, and development. Unlike interests, basic human needs are not bargainable; people will not trade their identities for money or surrender them even at gunpoint. And unlike values, they are not transmitted by a particular culture or inculcated by local institutions. These needs are basic because people cannot live and thrive unless they are satisfied, and they are human because everyone everywhere has them. Local cultures, or the state of a society's development, define the satisfiers of basic needs, but the needs themselves are universal. Moreover, according to this framework, they are irrepensible, demanding satisfaction no matter how a society's leaders may seek to suppress or manipulate them. This sharply separates basic human needs theory from conflict frameworks that assume the malleability of the individual and the social system's power to maintain itself either by persuading or coercing

Basic Human Needs

obedience. Suppose, for example, that a young person's membership in a street gang is a way of attempting to satisfy basic needs for identity, security, and human bonding -- needs sharpened by deteriorated family relationships and the dog-eat-dog environment of impoverished urban neighborhoods. Since these needs are irrepressible, and no alternative satisfiers are available, neither punishment nor education will alter the gang member's behavior. Not even a reward will have that effect, unless it somehow satisfies the unsatisfied needs.

On the other hand, these needs can be satisfied, and when they are, antisocial or self-destructive behavior stops. This separates the basic needs paradigm from other frameworks that assume that conflict is the result of people's inherent aggressiveness or the insatiability of their desires. Indeed, it is what makes the needs framework a theory of conflict resolution, not just conflict management. If the parties to a deep-rooted conflict can become conscious of the unsatisfied basic needs generating it, and if they can agree to change the existing social system to the extent necessary to satisfy them, the conflict can be terminated permanently, or at least rendered non-destructive. In the case of gang members, for example, this approach might suggest recognizing street organizations as partial satisfiers, at least, of basic needs, and attempting to redirect their activities from fighting and crime towards more useful enterprises. (A "summit meeting" of gang leaders held in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1993 proceeded on the basis of this

perspective.) But the needs theorist would also insist that gangs cannot be made obsolete without mending the tattered social fabric of the cities -- a task requiring a substantial overhaul of the existing social system.

By insisting that thoroughgoing social and political change can resolve conflicts over nonbargainable human needs, needs theorists expose themselves to the charge of "utopianism." Their response is that it is more unrealistic to suppose that conflicts over identity, security, human bonding, and development can be managed without satisfying these needs. Indeed, the failure of existing institutions to satisfy them is what accounts for the persistence and growth of serious social conflicts even in the most advanced industrial societies. The "bad news" announced by this theory is that, in the long run, no regime can afford the increasing costs of attempting to manage these inherently unmanageable conflicts. The "good news" is that resolving them is possible, although difficult. The satisfiers of basic human needs like identity and recognition are not in short supply. There is no reason why securing one group's identity or security, for example, should jeopardize the identity of another. Consequently, "win-win" solutions to some serious social conflicts are possible.

The strength of this paradigm lies in its ability to shed light on conflicts that seem incomprehensible from more traditional perspectives. Why should the former Soviet republics and the nations formerly incorporated in the Soviet Bloc insist

on their independence even when, in many cases, the results are extremely damaging to their economies? Why have Palestinians, Tamils, Kurds, Basques, and Tibetans waged bitter wars against enormous odds for national autonomy? Why are powerful majority groups sometimes so fearful of according recognition to minorities? The theory's insistence on the salience and strength of unsatisfied identity and security needs gives insight into what might otherwise seem entirely irrational behavior. It implies, moreover, that attempts to divide groups into "good" and "bad" categories depending upon their apparent power, or lack of it, are beside the point. In South Africa, for example, apartheid was doomed to fail. But majority rule could be a recipe for continuing conflict unless ways are found to satisfy the identity and security needs of all groups in that society.

Many questions raised by this framework have yet to be answered and are currently the subject of considerable debate. They include the following:

Which needs are so basic that conflicts involving them cannot be resolved either by bargaining or by coercion? Some theorists assert that, in addition to the needs already mentioned, people have a basic need for "sacred meaning" which drives them to reject purely materialistic and secular social systems. For others, "freedom" is such a need. Still others suggest the existence of basic needs that are fundamentally antisocial, like the "need to dominate others." But if everything that people strongly desire is considered a basic

human need, the theory becomes useless. Most analysts who use this framework, for example, believe that the alleged "need to dominate" is a morbid symptom produced by the failure to satisfy genuine human needs, while political freedom is a method of satisfying basic needs rather than a need in itself. Opinions differ as to whether there is a basic need for "sacred meaning," but the need for a coherent, meaningful environment (or what one theorist calls "consistency of response") is widely recognized. Greater disagreement exists when we ask what satisfiers will resolve social conflicts by fulfilling the parties' basic needs. Many needs theorists assert that the drive to secure one's identity, which generates powerful ethnic loyalties, cannot be satisfied short of granting political autonomy to ethnic groups that seek it. But does this mean that each group must become an independent nation? Or will some measure of autonomy short of independence (for example, the regional autonomy enjoyed by Spanish Catalans) satisfy this need sufficiently to terminate the conflict? Along the same lines, it would be important to know whether a particular system-change represents a partial or a complete satisfier of a basic human need, since in the former case, after some lapse of time, future conflict could be predicted. Once a person's ethnic identity has been secured, for example, will that need demand further satisfaction, perhaps in the form of identification with a nation, a social class, or even the human species itself?

Why is a particular conflict still going on even though one side is clearly overpowered? Does this suggest that basic human needs of the losing side are involved? Why did a settlement or peace treaty break down? Was it a compromise arrived at without identifying or satisfying both parties' basic human needs?

GENERAL:

Questions for Reporters

The principal limitation of the basic needs framework, however, is its failure, as presently stated, to specify the conditions under which people whose needs are unsatisfied will involve themselves in serious social conflict or engage in self-destructive behavior. Although basic human needs are, in theory, universal and irrepressible, it appears that people may sometimes go for a long time without organizing to demand their satisfaction. We need to know why "need-deprivation" produces behavioral change at certain times and places rather than others, and why this change sometimes takes the form of apathy or individual misbehavior, while at other times it takes the form of violent group conflict. We also need to know whether there are basic needs currently unrecognized as such (perhaps a need for creative activity or for play?) whose deprivation could cause serious conflict to erupt in the future.

AN ILLUSTRATION:

Leaders of political or social movements who are interested in settling a dispute often speak as if their positions were based on bargainable interests even when basic human needs are involved. Conversely, if they are not interested in settling the dispute (or if they want to up the ante in negotiations), they may insist that basic needs are at stake, even though their constituents' interests are essentially bargainable. Instead of focusing exclusively on leaders of groups in conflict, therefore, interviews with the rank-and-file can sometimes suggest whether basic human needs are at stake, or whether the parties are engaged in a conflict of interests that can be settled either by force or by compromise.

Suppose that the on-and-off negotiations currently being pursued between representatives of the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland and the British produce an agreement providing for an independent Northern Ireland: British troops to be removed, local militias to be disarmed, and the civil rights of the Catholic minority to be recognized. Suppose further that militant Irish nationalists disavow the agreement because it does not provide for Irish unification, and that militant Ulster nationalists disavow it because it does not protect them against the possibility of Irish unification. How can one evaluate the viability of the agreement? Interviewing and polling members of the Protestant and Catholic rank-and-file would indicate, first, the extent to which basic human needs for

identity and security are involved on both sides; and, second, the extent to which Irish unification (or the fear of it) is considered a necessary satisfier (or obstacle to satisfaction) of these needs. If people on both sides do not consider unification a necessary satisfier of basic human needs, the agreement may well be viable.

A more common situation, however, is this: the leaders of groups involved in settlement negotiations arrive at an agreement that protects their constituents' interests, as they understand them. But they may not have identified the basic needs generating the conflict. Journalists covering foreign or domestic negotiations who have identified the basic needs at issue will be able to make an informed judgment about the extent to which a proposed agreement satisfies them, hence, to predict the likelihood of the agreement "taking" at the popular level.

Relative Deprivation

The framework of relative deprivation attempts to explain both the psychological underpinnings of group conflict and the conflict's location and timing. It is one way of answering some of the questions posed earlier: Why do groups engage in conflict in this place rather than that, and why now rather than earlier or later? Like basic human needs theory, it begins by looking at individual motivations and behavior and extends these ideas to

group activity. But unlike needs theory, it does not distinguish between basic needs and bargainable interests. In this framework, conflict is the result of a widening gap between a group's value expectations -- those "goods," material or immaterial, to which its members believe they are entitled -- and the system's value capabilities -- the "goods" actually delivered by existing social institutions. When the gap between a group's expectations and the system's delivery capabilities gets wide enough, a rebellion of some sort is predictable.

The psychological basis for this framework is an older theory called frustration-aggression. This states that aggressive behavior is a predictable response to situations in which individuals find it impossible to attain desired goals. People are seldom spontaneously aggressive, but they have a capacity for hostile action that can be triggered by a high enough level of frustration. The more intensely they desire certain goals, and the more obstructed they are in realizing them, the higher their level of frustration. And the higher the level of frustration, the more likely it is to produce an angry, aggressive response.

Relative deprivation theory recognizes that not all frustration produces aggression against others. Fear of punishment, social conditioning, or other cultural inhibitors can sometimes induce people to swallow their frustrations or to direct their aggression against themselves. Sometimes, although hostility is directed against others, it is displaced by targeting a particularly vulnerable or disliked group rather than

the actual source of the frustration. According to this framework, what triggers overt conflict are acts by some person or group that are seen as the source of intolerable frustration, whether this perception is accurate or not. The fight against an opponent is cathartic. It releases frustration through vigorous, aggressive action. But the aggression often produces a reinforcing "conflict spiral," since it is likely to be resisted by the opponent, thus causing yet another source of frustration, a new outburst of aggression, and so forth.

The relative deprivation hypothesis applies this theory to social and political frustration by describing three basic situations in which serious group conflict is most likely. It is important to note that, in the situations described below, "expectations" refers to immaterial as well as material values (status and dignity as well as power and property), and that group members' expectations are generally based on their own past performance and sense of entitlement rather than on the performances of other groups.

In the first situation, a group's expectations for material advancement or other benefits rise rapidly, but the system continues to deliver the goods at its old levels. This sort of "incremental deprivation" (sometimes called a "revolution of rising expectations") has produced a wide range of angry but optimistic movements to transform the old system. A number of "middle class revolutions," including the American and French Revolutions, as well as movements for social or political reform,

are thought to have their roots in this sort of relative deprivation.

Where expectations remain relatively constant, but the system's ability to meet them declines or collapses (so-called "decremental deprivation"), the stage is set for a conservative or reactionary revolt whose aim is to restore the group's or nation's fortunes to their former state. Some analysts have pointed to the financial collapse of the German middle class during the 1920s and early 1930s as an example of decremental deprivation producing the reactionary National Socialist movement.

Finally, while a group's expectations rise, the system's ability to satisfy them may decline: an explosive situation sometimes called "progressive deprivation." This is the state of affairs most likely to produce high levels of group frustration and powerful outbursts of aggression such as those experienced during major wars and violent revolutions. According to one theorist, a variant of this theme, the so-called "J-Curve of frustrated expectations," signals the onset of violent conflict whatever the form of relative deprivation may be. Although the gap between expectations and satisfactions may be widening steadily, people do not rebel (or governments repress) until some shocking event suddenly and dramatically widens the gap. In a situation of incremental deprivation, for example, the economy suddenly plunges into a depression. Or, where the deprivation is decremental, a group's expectations are dramatically raised

(perhaps by the triumph of some ally in a neighboring nation). It is sudden change that dramatizes the deprivation, and in doing so, raises the level of frustration to an intolerable level. The strength of this framework lies in the attention it focuses on the social and psychological history of groups that are, or that may be, parties to conflict. Rather than asking how well or poorly a group is doing in absolute terms, it invites analysts to track its members' expectations over a period of time, and to evaluate them relative to the system's rising or declining ability to provide satisfactions. If one looks through the lenses of this theory at the Palestinian Intifadah, for example, what is striking is not just the suffering of the Palestinian population under occupation, but the extent to which rising levels of education and employment had raised the expectations of a younger generation of Palestinians for a better life even under oppressive conditions. Similarly, in analyzing neo-Nazi movements in the United States, it is worth noting that rapid declines in manufacturing and in family farming lowered the economic system's delivery capabilities (without lowering expectations) in many of the regions in which these movements were most active.

What limits the framework's usefulness, on the other hand, is, first, its inability to predict when a widening gap between expectations and satisfactions will produce overt conflict, and, second, its failure to indicate what type of conflict (violent or nonviolent, incoherent or organized, etc.) is most likely to

result. These problems, which are related, derive from a central weakness of frustration-aggression theory: its reliance on political, cultural, and personal "variables" to explain both the timing and quality of social conflict. Frustrated expectations on the streets of Los Angeles, for example, may generate aggressive burning and looting, while the same level of frustration in Tokyo produces only an increase in cases of individual depression. Revelations of government corruption in Western societies are generally considered to raise politically bargainable issues; "throw the rascals out" is therefore an accepted electoral slogan. But in other cultures (for example, certain Islamic societies at present), corruption may be viewed as a sign that the entire political order must be swept away.

Obviously, one cannot understand social conflict without knowing a good deal about the society in which it erupts. But if key social variables are not accounted for by a general theory of conflict, the theory will not be as useful as it ought to be. For this reason, journalists may want to consider using the frameworks described here in combination. For example, while a high degree of relative deprivation might indicate the likelihood of a group becoming politically active, the basic human needs framework can tell us whether the issues in dispute are bargainable or non-bargainable. Theories describing particular cultures or social orders can also be brought into play to deepen the interpretation of specific forms of conflict. The presence of powerful inhibitors of overt conflict in cultures like Japan's

Advancing, or declining? (3) How quickly are measures of the system's capability to supply those goods holding steady, or spiritual values do group members hold most dear? (2) Is the questions are answered: (1) Which economic, political, cultural, But this information can be misleading unless three further useful baseline for analysis of the group members' expectations. social performance relative to its earlier standards provides a Acquiring data about a particular group's economic and

AN ILLUSTRATION:

How can a journalist tell whether a group's value expectations are rising or falling? How can the reporter know whether the gap between expectations and system capabilities is widening or narrowing? How might this knowledge influence the reporting of a specific conflict?

GENERAL:

Questions for Reporters

is indisputable. How successful they will remain in channeling conflict behavior into accustomed forms may well depend on the erosive effects of modernization on Japanese traditions; the extent to which the basic needs of various groups for identity, security, and development are satisfied; and the degree to which the Japanese system meets its people's expectations for continued progress.

group's and the system's performance changing? The last question is very important, since expectations and satisfactions are not unrelated. If system capabilities decline slowly, they often pull expectations down with them; and if expectations rise slowly, they may give the system a chance to adjust its capabilities to the new level of demand. Rapid change along either axis is particularly destabilizing.

These considerations may be valuable, for example, in considering the prospects for conflict in the former Soviet Bloc states. In Eastern Europe, popular expectations for freedom and self-determination rose very quickly as Soviet power was withdrawn and national independence was regained. These expectations were satisfied, in most cases, by the replacement of old Communist regimes by freely elected governments. From 1990 on, however, the economic situation in many ex-Communist states worsened, in some cases, quite disastrously.

Is this likely to produce serious social conflict? Is it already doing so? Some journalists grappling with these questions have already noted that the economies of the ex-Communist states had been declining for a considerable time before the "Revolutions of 1989" occurred. The result may well have been to pull down most groups' economic expectations. At the same time, the prioritizing of political and cultural concerns over economic values gave the new governments breathing room. The principal challenges to their authority came from groups suffering decremental deprivation as a result of the

collapse of various social safety nets. But there are now signs that economic expectations are rising, particularly among those who believe themselves entitled to share in the wealth being generated by new capitalist enterprises. So far, this development has produced a certain amount of political opposition in Poland, Hungary, and other nations, but the major symptom of the widening expectation/satisfaction gap has been an increase in mafia-type criminal activities. Under these circumstances, however, journalists aware of the relative deprivation framework will be alert to the possibility that an economic "takeoff" in any of the ex-Communist states could generate unexpected conflict between the society's relative haves and have-nots.

V. CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS

We conclude this review of general conflict theories with a brief look at two controversial frameworks that locate the sources of serious social conflict in particular forms of social or cultural organization. According to class struggle theory, the entities whose relations are most likely to generate violent conflict are socioeconomic classes. The clash of civilizations paradigm, on the other hand, pictures cultural identity groups as the primary contestants for power. Both frameworks are global, offering insights into the forces (often unconscious) that are shaping conflict in the post-Cold War world. Both see serious conflict as an inevitable outcome of deep social divisions. And both take a dim view of the prospects for thoroughgoing conflict resolution, at least so long as world society is divided along class or cultural lines.

Few modern social conflicts can be described accurately without using the analytical tools provided by the theories of class and culture struggle. Even journalists who do not accept the pessimistic implications of these frameworks will find them useful in analyzing current social conflicts and attempting to anticipate the conflicts of the future.

Class Struggle

Class struggle theory identifies two primary generators of destructive conflict. The first is the division of society into social classes: groups differentiated in terms of their prosperity, power, and opportunities for human development on the basis of their control (or lack of control) over productive resources. The second, closely related, is the persistence of unnecessary scarcities -- scarcities not only of economic opportunities and income, but also of social services, leisure time, gratifying work, and stable personal relationships. According to this framework, the combination of unequally empowered classes and unnecessary scarcities is what prevents human beings from realizing their true potential for creativity and sociability. For while people are basically cooperative, class society forces them to compete for survival and recognition. While most seek personally gratifying work, class society requires them to labor at dull, alienating jobs. And while most want to live in peace and freedom, class society makes violence and domination seem inevitable, if not actually virtuous.

Three types of conflict are endemic to this kind of social order. First, large social classes struggle against each other for overall supremacy. Second, sub-groups within each class battle for relative influence and power. Third, identity groups of all sorts -- racial, ethnic, national, and religious -- come

into conflict, often without recognizing that problems caused by the class system are at the root of their differences.

We focus here on the first type of conflict: class against class. But when competing groups within classes develop radically opposed visions of the good society, or when cultural differences are superimposed on intra-class conflicts, these struggles can also be extremely destructive. In the United States, for example, regularly employed, more culturally assimilated workers long fought bitterly to exclude or dominate less privileged groups that were used by employers to undermine wage rates, weaken unions, and break strikes. Since those at the very bottom of the social ladder were often African-Americans or recently arrived immigrants, the better-established workers saw them as a cultural or religious as well as an economic threat. Although some labor organizations found ways to manage this type of conflict, it was never resolved, and recent waves of immigration seem to have revived it.

Conflicts between classes are potentially even more explosive, since the questions they raise are not just distributive; they are not just about how the social pie should be divided but how society should be organized. Should goods and services be produced for profit or on some other basis? Should decisions about what to produce, how, and for whom be made by private enterprises, political authorities, or some other actors? Is it unethical or simply sensible to charge what the market will bear and to pay one's employees as low a wage as possible? To

what extent should a person's life chances depend upon his or her parents' income and social position? Fundamental questions of this sort are not decided by peaceful bargaining among interest groups, but as the result of violent or potentially violent class struggle. And so long as inequality and scarcity, the sources of class conflict, persist, they cannot be answered permanently but reappear with every significant alteration of the social environment.

Consider our current class system. Several centuries of socioeconomic change in Europe turned formerly marginal groups of commercial farmers, merchants, and traders into a powerful class of capitalists capable of challenging landowning aristocrats and their allies for social and political supremacy. There was no question of negotiating out these differences; either society would remain under the control of its traditional elite, or the new commercial class would reorganize it from top to bottom. Ever since the overthrow of the aristocratic regimes, Western societies have been dominated by this class, which succeeded in imposing its own conceptions of law and property, political institutions and social organization, on all other sectors of society. For better and for worse, the ideas and energies unleashed by capitalism created most of the essential institutions of what we now call modern society.

Even so, rule by businessmen and their political allies remained unstable even in the European heartland. Uneven economic development accentuated social divisions and created new

ones; vast populations became mobile; trade wars tended to become shooting wars; and the lower classes who bore most of the burdens of the new system were drawn willily-illy into politics. By the mid-nineteenth century, those whose only productive asset was their labor power had begun to pose a challenge to business rule. The challenge could be answered in two ways. First, by force: In 1870-1871, in the wake of the Franco-Prussian war, the revolutionary Commune of Paris was suppressed by the French army at the cost of some 50,000 lives, foreshadowing the annihilation of the German workers' movement some sixty years later. Second, by reform. If capitalism could generate a large enough economic surplus, the business community could offer those without capital, or those with very little, higher standards of living, mass education and other social services, political participation, and prospects for a better life.

To some extent, increases in labor productivity resulting from technological advances helped generate the needed surplus. But an essential part of the answer was global expansion, or, to use the more loaded term, "imperialism." In order to survive the twin threats of domestic discontent and foreign competition, Western business interests were driven to secure cheap sources of raw materials and labor, expand their markets, and find profitable investment outlets abroad. This effort, in turn, required both a vast strengthening of the state apparatus and a global expansion of its political and military power. The results of this expansion were mixed. On the one hand, the drive

to create and capture a world market brought great riches to the industrially developed nations and induced most Western workers to put national loyalty ahead of class loyalties and ambitions. On the other, it produced two world wars, revolutionized traditional societies, and globalized the class struggle.

In Russia, poor to begin with and gravely weakened by World War I, socialist revolutionaries succeeded in overthrowing both the monarchy and the business elite. Similarly, at the end of World War II, the workers and farmers of several nations impoverished by war and foreign domination followed the Russian example and overthrew their capitalist rulers. But the Communist elites that succeeded them proved unable either to empower their own people or to stabilize their rule. Economically backward to begin with, drained by years of war and civil strife, surrounded by hostile powers, and cut off from the developing world market, these states were ruled by bureaucrats whose authority rested precariously upon the two pillars of collectivized property and state terror. In hindsight, the decline seems inevitable, although few analysts of any school predicted the sudden collapse of the Communist states from within.

In the wake of this collapse, many commentators have proclaimed that class struggle is no longer a major cause of social conflict. The "End of History" theorists maintain, in effect, that in the advanced industrial nations, class conflict has been replaced by interest-group bargaining under law -- a happy (or at least less contradictory) state that all nations

will sooner or later attain. But is this true? Is class conflict obsolete in the West? The answer depends to a great extent on the continued viability of the "social contracts" negotiated during the Great Depression of the 1930s and the years after World War II. Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, for example, helped stabilize North American capitalism by recognizing the labor unions as legitimate interest groups, as well as by creating a welfare state offering working people social benefits. This new system was largely financed by profits generated by World War II and America's postwar expansion. In other words, by extending the regime of bargainable interests to include labor and management as interest groups, it confirmed the non-bargainable principles of private property, production for profit, and management's right to make essential business decisions.

The result (paralleled by similar developments in Europe) was to lower the level of class conflict significantly by mitigating its twin causes, inequality and scarcity. But how permanent is this solution? Those who proclaim the end of class conflict make two important assumptions: first, that the interest group system will continue to function as an effective replacement for class conflict; second, that technological change and global expansion will continue to lessen economic scarcities. Both assumptions may be challenged. Throughout the West and in Japan, the labor movement is in serious decline, jeopardizing the conflict management system based on effective interest groups.

Moreover, although the collapse of the Communist Bloc has opened new territories to capitalist expansion, intense competition between business groups centered in rival nations has built serious irrationalities into the world market. The results, in addition to two decades of wage decreases, include rising unemployment, deindustrialization of older manufacturing centers, rapid growth of a restive "underclass," and huge budget deficits that threaten existing social programs.

Journalists may wonder whether, under these circumstances, the termination of the Cold War betokens the end of class animosity or a new era of class struggle. A related question is this: Will intensified competition between the Great Powers remain economic? Or will it spill over into political and military confrontation? In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, each nation's business class has moved to dominate its historic sphere of influence, with Germany establishing economic supremacy in Eastern Europe, Japan in East Asia, and the United States in Latin America and the Middle East. Other territories are hotly contested. The victors of the Cold War seem eager to maintain their alliance and have created a number of collaborative institutions for this purpose. But prior periods of collaboration eventually gave way to trade wars, and trade wars to shooting wars. What, if anything, will avert the same outcome this time?

The class system also continues to generate conflict between advanced nations seeking to control markets and supplies of raw

materials globally and less developed nations contending for regional hegemony. We have recently seen a bloody example in the war of the U.S.-led Coalition against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and other conflicts of this type are simmering elsewhere. But internal class struggles are intensifying most radically in nations like Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union, newly-liberated South Africa, Brazil, Algeria, and India. With Soviet Communism discredited, what form will such struggles take? And how, if at all, will they be managed?

One answer, of course, is that reports of the "death of communism," to paraphrase Mark Twain, have been greatly exaggerated. Some theorists insist that as class conflict spreads and intensifies, workers and other have-not groups will again seek alternatives to the system of production for profit (an example is the strength of the Workers Party in Brazil). Others believe that class struggle is likely to take more disguised forms or to be redirected towards the defense of threatened cultural identities (examples are radical Islamism in Algeria and the Zhirinovsky movement in Russia). The lesson in all this for journalists is to take current speculation about the "end of class struggle/end of history" with more than a grain of salt. Movements that are ostensibly ethnic, nationalist, cultural, or religious often express the aspirations and fears of conflicting social classes or intra-class groupings. Few conflicts of any sort can be

understood without inquiring into the class background and history of the conflicting parties.

Questions for Reporters

GENERAL:

How can a journalist determine whether a violent conflict is a manifestation of cultural struggle, class struggle, or both? How might these discoveries improve a reporter's coverage of the conflict?

AN ILLUSTRATION:

When South Central Los Angeles exploded in rioting in the spring of 1992, journalists generally assumed (as did the public) that they were witnessing a "race riot" akin to the urban uprisings of the 1960s. This impression was reinforced by the fact that rioting in Los Angeles was triggered by the verdict of an all-white jury exonerating four Los Angeles policemen in the beating of a black motorist, Rodney King. It was strengthened by television footage showing black rioters assaulting a white truck driver, Reginald Denny, and by reports that blacks were attacking Asian-owned stores. Such analysis of the riot as there was (and

there was not a great deal) discussed the historic cultural cleavage between America's white and black communities, the alleged police brutality against African-Americans, and the poor living conditions and disrupted family lives of Los Angeles's black population.

To the surprise of many, however, figures later issued by the police showed that the majority of those arrested had been Hispanic, not African-American, and that substantial numbers of white and Asian citizens had also been arrested for riot-connected misbehavior. Unlike the rioters of the 1960s, those of South Central and East Los Angeles had gone outside their home communities to loot stores in more affluent parts of town. And when rioting began a few days later in other cities, it did not follow the 1960s pattern either, but involved a melange of cultural groups sharing a common social class position rather than a common ethnic heritage.

Journalists sensitive to the importance of social class as a major source of conflict might have appreciated the fact that the Los Angeles riot was not a repetition of the disorders of the 1960s, but something new in American history: a multiethnic uprising of those near the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. Culture was not irrelevant to an understanding of these events, but the culture requiring analysis was that of Los Angeles's lower class, which united poor blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and whites rather than dividing them. By the same token, the absence of any prevailing ethnic identity among the rioters probably made

joint political activity in the wake of the riot more difficult. Although there were efforts to organize the poor residents of Los Angeles to secure improved living conditions, there was no equivalent to the "Black Power" movement that followed in the wake of the 1960s uprisings.

Following the Los Angeles Riot, leading journalists formed an influential committee to investigate and report on relations between the Los Angeles Police Department and the city's poor communities. This report played an important role in connection with the Los Angeles Police Commissioner's subsequent resignation. But a more searching and penetrating approach to the social basis of this riot would have produced more interesting, less stereotyped coverage from the beginning, as well as more useful analysis of its causes and possible cures.

The Clash of Civilizations

When people suffering economic hardship also feel themselves insulted or endangered by outsiders representing a foreign culture, they may be persuaded to unite against the perceived common enemy under the banner of a common nationality, religion, or culture. In the Islamic World, for example, the drive toward economic, political, and social independence, fuelled by mass demands for higher living standards and social recognition, now appears in the form of revolutionary Islamism, a movement for

cultural solidarity and autonomy led by local intellectuals, religious leaders, and businessmen. In India, a variety of class-based discontents and ambitions are worked out in the form of Hindu nationalism and Hindu-Muslim conflict; while in Russia, those workers and pensioners most hostile to free-market capitalism call themselves Russian nationalists and preach a return to anti-Western "Pan-Slavism."

Is a struggle between cultures or "civilizations," then, the most likely form of global conflict in the immediate future? From a class struggle perspective, militant cultural movements like Pan-Islamism and Pan-Slavism represent a form of "false consciousness." Rather than resolving class differences, they perpetuate and exacerbate them. But the clash of civilizations framework, a theory now evoking much interest among conflict analysts, views cultural distinctions, not class differences, as the primary sources of future social conflict. As Samuel P. Huntington puts it: "The fundamental source of conflict in this new [post-Cold War] world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future." (Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993).

Other forms of conflict, in this view, are already being replaced by the clash of civilizations. With the West's internal conflicts largely settled, Western civilization finds itself in increasing contact and conflict with other civilizations, each sharing a common cultural (that is, linguistic, religious, historical, legal, and political) identity. Within each of these major culture-groups -- Islamic, Hindu, Chinese, Japanese, Slavic/Orthodox, Latin American, and African -- there are still serious divisions. Even so, conflicts between them (such as the Hindu-Islamic struggle in India and the Slavic/Orthodox-Western-Muslim war in Bosnia), are multiplying and intensifying. But while the drive toward "civilization-identity" gradually unites each civilization against the others, Western economic, political, and military power tends to make that civilization a universal target. The primary struggle of the future, therefore, is likely to be "the West against the Rest."

According to this framework, the prospects for managing inter-civilization conflict peacefully are dim. Civilizations are as likely as nation-states were to seek global hegemony through a combination of force and diplomacy. Moreover, since clashing cultures, by definition, do not share many common values, violence is highly likely, particularly along cultural boundary lines. Already, according to Huntington, there are signs of emergence of an "Islamic-Confucian" alliance that could pose a serious threat not only to Western interests, but to the interests of other civilizations that share (at least in part)

the Western commitments to political democracy and cultural pluralism. Current hopes for a peaceful "New World Order" are therefore utopian. The best one can hope for in a hostile, multi-cultural world is an uneasy coexistence of civilizations, perhaps based on some new version of "balance of power" politics.

The framework of culture struggle has several virtues. To begin with, it emphasizes the role played by different worldviews in generating serious social conflict. Culture is not simply "ideology," in the sense of a facade disguising material interests, nor is it reducible to tribal customs or "folkways." It denotes the diverse systems of thought and feeling -- the separate realms of discourse -- characteristic of groups long isolated from each other. The theory rightly calls attention to the explosive potential inherent in increased contact between cultures formerly separated, or connected only by relationships of power. It foresees the decline of the nation-state as the primary actor in world politics, and it predicts the rise of large transnational groups -- global "families," as it were -- linked by cultural affinities and economic ties.

Critics point out, however, that while the clash of civilizations describes a possible effect (quite possibly, an important one) of current changes in world society, it is not self-caused. A culture or civilization is not a set of rigid values or attitudes that have existed unchanged since time immemorial; it is a creation that is constantly being adapted to

suit people's current needs. Furthermore, differing cultures do not come into conflict spontaneously or naturally. On the contrary, most of the history of civilizations is a story of peaceful cultural transformation (accommodation, absorption, or acculturation) rather than a Social Darwinist horror tale. In addition to differences, something else is needed to generate intercultural conflict. For example, if the West had not attempted to dominate the rest of the world economically, would any one now be predicting a conflict of "the West against the Rest"? And the logical next question: If we could identify and eliminate the historic social, economic, and political causes of that conflict, would that not defuse the civilizational conflict as well?

This brings our discussion full circle -- back to the idea of "mismatch" with which it began. For if serious social conflict is the result of a mismatch between what people most deeply want and need and what various institutions are prepared to provide, the question posed is this: How can people and social institutions be better matched? Suppose that the culture struggle theorists are right, and that people will attempt to satisfy their needs for identity and recognition by identifying themselves increasingly with one or another of the world's major civilizations. Is it impossible to envisage practical methods of resolving inter-civilization conflicts? Our concluding chapter will outline the processes now being used to resolve cultural and other forms of conflict by practitioners of conflict resolution.

Questions for Reporters

GENERAL:

Even while trying hard to be objective, Western journalists are likely to interpret a clash of civilizations involving Western and non-Western contestants as a conflict between "civilization" and "barbarism." Is there a way to cover such a conflict without being overly pro-Western and without pretending to be value-free?

AN EXAMPLE:

The death sentence decreed by the Iranian clergy against "blasphemous" novelist Salman Rushdie was considered an outrage in the West, since it violated the core Western value of freedom of expression. Western journalists were particularly likely to find themselves bitterly opposed to the Ayatollah Khomeini's decree, since their own professional integrity and security depend upon vindicating the freedom of the press. But to many pious Muslims, Rushdie's heretical book, Satanic Verses, was the greater outrage, since its publication violated the core Islamic value of respect for religion.

The clash of civilizations framework alone provides little guidance to a journalist seeking to understand this conflict. Why should Rushdie's book, not even published in Farsi or Arabic,

have caused such an outburst of rage throughout the Islamic world? Surely, one factor exacerbating the conflict was the fact that Rushdie was an apostate Muslim living in the West -- a "renegade" using his privileged position to ridicule his own people (or so it seemed to them) in the eyes of foreigners. But even this explanation is insufficient to explain the extreme sensitivity of zealous Muslims to the apparent insult to their Prophet. To explain why civilizations sometimes clash, while at other times they coexist peacefully or even merge, one must make use of other analytical frameworks. For example:

Basic human needs. By identifying themselves, first and foremost, as Muslims, many people in the Islamic world are attempting to fulfill long unsatisfied human needs for identity and recognition. The outpouring of rage against Rushdie and other apostates is incomprehensible unless one takes into account the power of these needs and the long period of humiliation (or "negative identity") that preceded their current assertion.

Relative deprivation. In attempting to understand the timing of the Islamic revival, it is useful to consider how highly uneven economic and social development, fueled by oil revenues, raised mass expectations for further change while blocking their satisfaction. This framework can usefully be combined with that of modernization. Since Western-style modernization enriched and corrupted certain sectors of Islamic society while impoverishing others, it awakened mass demands for a form of modernization consistent with national traditions.

Class struggle. Clearly, the century-long domination of Iran and other Islamic peoples by Western business interests is relevant to an understanding of their current anti-Western passion. In particular, one recalls Britain's imposition of the Pahlavi dynasty on Iran, the overthrow of the moderate nationalist, Mossadegh, by the CIA, and the ghastly reign of terror unleashed a decade later by the Shah's American-trained secret police. Some may call the subjugation of Iran, or, for that matter, the Persian Gulf War, a "clash of civilizations," but the great industrial powers' need for assured supplies of low-priced oil seems more germane.

In short, it is possible to cover civilizational clashes like that represented by the Rushdie affair without surrendering one's own framework of cultural and political values, and also without xenophobic partisanship. The key is to use the analytic frameworks discussed here (and any other frameworks that may be useful) to understand, as far as one can, the roots of the conflict. It is not true, as the French proverb has it, that "to understand all is to forgive all." But without this understanding, the journalist can easily find himself or herself acting unwittingly as a firebrand -- one who escalates a conflict that might have been peacefully and fairly resolved.

VI. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION PROCESSES

Conflict analysis and resolution is a relatively new field of study and practice that has grown very rapidly during the past decade. Its primary purpose has been to harness new methods of analyzing various sorts of conflict to processes designed to settle, manage, or resolve them nonviolently, to the satisfaction of all conflicting parties. An overview of the institutions involved in developing the field and of some recent literature that may be of particular interest to journalists is presented in the Appendix. This chapter is devoted to outlining the basic vocabulary and concepts of conflict resolution, "mapping" the field of practice, and discussing a range of conflict management and resolution processes with which journalists should be familiar. It closes with a brief review of some of the "frontier" areas presenting crucial problems and opportunities for all conflict analysts, whether they are policymakers, scholars, or journalists.

Conflict Resolution: Basic Vocabulary and Concepts

In general, people try to settle their conflicts in one of three ways: by force, by law, or by "working it out." One party can impose its wishes on the other by using or threatening to use force (the method of power). The parties can make use of

accepted legislative or judicial processes (the method of law). Or they can decide to work their differences out using one or more of the processes described below, which are referred to loosely as processes of conflict resolution. We say "loosely," because a distinction is emerging in the field between dispute settlement, conflict management, and conflict resolution.

Settlement refers to agreements that terminate an immediate dispute, but with no assurance that the underlying issues causing the conflict have been dealt with. As a result, while the dispute may be settled, the conflict that spawned it remains unresolved. For example, a trial or plea bargain that sends a drug dealer to jail settles the state's dispute with him; it does not resolve the conflict between drug dealers and other sectors of the community. Even a voluntary agreement that fails to solve the problem causing the conflict (for example, an agreement by producers of a non-renewable resource to fix prices and set production limits) is unlikely to stand the tests of time and change.

Management means that the parties have agreed on some more or less systematic method of settling recurrent disputes between them, but, again, without necessarily ending the conflict by identifying and eliminating its causes. In fact, parties adopting a conflict management system usually agree that their conflict is either not resolvable or inappropriate for resolution. For example, the systems of administrative law and practice adopted by most Western nations are designed both to

perpetuate and to "civilize" conflicts between labor unions and managers, manufacturers and consumers, importers and exporters, environmentalists and business corporations, etc. In the same way, electoral systems are designed to manage conflicts between groups seeking political office, not to resolve them.

Resolution, on the other hand, means ending the conflict by eliminating or "transforming" the causes that generated it. Agreements reflecting a resolution of conflict are generally voluntary, satisfactory to all parties, durable, and self-enforcing. Frequently, they reconstruct the larger system that has embroiled the parties in conflict. An example is the agreement establishing the Swiss Confederation, which established a cantonal system ending centuries of communal warfare in that nation. Another (if one leaves aside the unresolved question of slavery) is the United States Constitution of 1789. Similarly, while the peace treaties ending the World Wars I and II can be said to have settled the conflict between the nations of Western Europe, the treaty establishing a European Economic Community points in the direction of resolution.

Processes for working out differences can either be relatively autonomous, that is, clearly separated from the methods of power and law, or closely related to them. "Negotiation," for example, can mean pure power-bargaining, as when the representatives of two conflicting parties meet to ratify the results reached on the battlefield or in economic competition. Or it can mean talks designed to identify the

parties' deeper interests and needs in order to find mutually acceptable methods of satisfying them (what conflict resolvers call "collaborative problem-solving"). Similarly, "mediation" can refer to an attempt by a powerful third party to compel two weaker disputants to accept a settlement that it has designed, or it can denote a process in which the third party functions strictly as an unbiased, non-coercive "facilitator."

Most practitioners of conflict resolution tend to favor autonomous, voluntary processes over settlements based on force or legal rules. This preference stems from the belief that although agreements imposed by force or declared by judges or lawmakers may settle (and sometimes manage) disputes, they seldom resolve conflicts. In fact, to the extent that they ignore or exacerbate a conflict's underlying causes, settlements can set the stage for a renewal of the struggle on a more intense and violent level. (Recall the arms control agreements reached by representatives of the Great Powers not long before the outbreak of World War II.) Some conflict analysts argue that where the violence used to settle a conflict is intense enough, it may succeed in eliminating the conflict's causes. After two world wars and more than fifty million dead, for example, the nations of Western Europe have finally arrived at some degree of unity. But violence at a lower level of intensity is notoriously ineffective as a conflict resolver, since it generally leaves the conflict-generating system untouched.

Legal processes and negotiations "in the shadow of the courtroom" also come in for criticism by those interested in conflict resolution. The problem here is not only that these methods tend to be costly and lengthy, favoring the better-heeled parties, but that the legal system is designed to maintain order by settling disputes authoritatively, not to solve underlying social problems. At its very best, it renders "equal justice under law." The judicial system's guiding maxim is to treat like cases alike -- the basis for the practice of following precedent -- while the guiding principle of conflict resolution is to satisfy each party's needs. Precedent is irrelevant (or even burdensome) to the effort to identify and satisfy the needs of disparate individuals and groups. This may be one reason that needs-based issues, like issues of child custody, are now handled initially in many jurisdictions by court-approved mediators rather than by judges.

A corollary principle is that only the parties in conflict can identify their needs and decide which measures are most likely to satisfy them. Conflict resolution is both a learning process and a decision-making process; this is why decisions based on imposition ordinarily fail to resolve conflicts. Legal procedures that give a judge the power to decide what is just for others take both learning and decision making out of the parties' hands. Even where the authoritative "third party" is a legislative majority, the majority is not competent to define the minority's basic needs or to determine how best to satisfy them.

The experience of seriously divided societies from Northern Ireland to Sri Lanka shows that, for this reason, majority rule can be as inimical as tyranny to a nation's long-term peace and stability.

Finally, if they do not get to the roots of the conflict, even autonomous processes may fail to reach a durable, satisfactory resolution. For this same reason, there is a strong suspicion of compromise among conflict resolution practitioners. "Splitting the difference" is sometimes a convenient way of settling interest-based disputes, especially when the quantity of resources to be divided among rival claimants is limited (a so-called "zero-sum game"). But where more basic needs, values, or interests are involved, or where the sources of conflict lie in the way a system is structured, compromise is a recipe for continuing conflict. Rather than giving each party less than what it wants (an outcome that often sharpens dissatisfaction), conflict resolvers assist all parties to get what they most deeply need. The search for what has variously been called a "win-win" solution, an "integrative" agreement, or a "problem-solving" outcome drives the most ambitious conflict resolution processes.

Mapping the Field of Conflict Resolution

Using the concepts outlined above, one can "map" the major areas of practice in the field of conflict resolution. Here we focus on processes that are relatively autonomous; that is, those in which the parties themselves, in some cases aided by a mediator or facilitator, arrive at an agreement that is not directly imposed on them by force or by legal authority. (Readers will be aware, of course, that in a world suffused by power and law, few agreements are concluded without some recognition of these realities.) In general, we can distinguish between three process areas: alternatives to litigation, alternatives to conventional public administration, and alternatives to war or civil violence.

Alternatives to litigation are known by the generic title "alternative dispute resolution," or ADR. These processes range from settlement negotiations by the parties or their lawyers to mediation of disputes that might otherwise end up in court. They also include conciliation of opposed parties, arbitration (often mandated by labor agreements and other contracts), and various novel or hybrid procedures. Examples of hybrid procedures are "med-arb" (in which the mediator is empowered to act as a decision-making arbitrator if an impasse is reached), "mini-trials" (relatively informal mock trials designed to exhibit the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' cases), impartial fact-

finding (designed to settle disputed questions of fact), "rent-a-judge" procedures, and more.

In general, ADR processes are private, avoiding the publicity attendant upon proceedings in open court. As a rule, they are more informal and flexible than legal proceedings, thus permitting the disputing parties to reduce the time and costs involved in litigation, as well as to fashion agreements not bound by legal precedent. And since the parties can construct the process that suits them best, they permit a degree of expertise on the part of third parties (mediators, arbitrators, impartial fact-finders, and so forth) that is often lacking in a judge or jury. On the negative side, the privacy of most ADR procedures, while useful to the immediate parties, can be used to avoid socially "healthy" publicity. ADR may be used to settle disputes that might produce important legal precedents if permitted to go to trial. And these processes controlled by the disputants generally assume that the parties are roughly equal in negotiating competence and do not need the protection of more formal court procedures.

The use of ADR processes by potential litigants in the United States is growing rapidly. This reflects both the clogged calendars of the civil courts, the rising expenses of litigation, and dissatisfaction with the results of judicial decision making. There seems little doubt that these processes can facilitate effective settlements of interest-based disputes. They are being used widely for interpersonal and small claims disputes and in

child custody and divorce cases. Large businesses have become greatly interested in using ADR procedures to handle customer complaints, to deal with employee grievances of various sorts, and to settle commercial lawsuits.

In general, however, these techniques are not designed to resolve broader or more complex social conflicts. Most ADR procedures assume that the parties understand their own interests quite well, although they may be barred temporarily from pursuing them by emotion, commitment to some previously established position, or mutual misunderstanding. They aim at removing these obstacles to rational negotiation and opening the parties' eyes to settlement options that they had not considered. But ADR seldom deals with the more difficult situations posed when the parties' basic interests or needs are not clear even to them, when they do not share a commitment to common legal or political norms, or when the causes of their conflict are rooted in a malfunctioning system. Where these indications of more serious conflict are present, other processes may be more appropriate.

Alternatives to conventional public administration represent another rapidly growing area of practice. Their basic thrust is to replace or supplement the methods of "top-down" governance with processes that allow all those interested in a particular public policy (the "stakeholders") to share in the formation, interpretation, and even the enforcement of policy. In some ways, public dispute resolution (PDR) processes are like those of

ADR. They are designed to permit disputing parties to work out their differences without going to court; they assume that the parties share basic normative commitments; and they work best when the disputants are organized as active interest groups. But in other respects, PDR processes are different. They tend to be public, not private. Often they involve a large number of parties representing diverse community interests. They permit a wider range of underlying problems to be identified, and they sometimes suggest system-changes that might help to solve them.

An example of PDR is the trend towards mediation of public policy disputes, for example, disputes over land use and environmental issues. Instead of formulating a policy that is bound to generate lengthy political and legal battles among interested parties, the public authority (or the parties themselves) can create a forum that permits all major "stakeholders" to identify their interests, anticipate future disputes, envisage policy alternatives, and work out a method of dealing with the issue that meets their needs. The forum may be a single meeting or a series of workshops, town meetings, or task force sessions lasting several months (or, in highly complex cases, several years). Often, an expert in PDR is brought in to help shape the proceedings and assist the parties to envisage new policies. And in some cases, the processes developed to deal with particular controversies ad hoc prove useful enough to become part of regular administrative practice.

Recently, PDR processes have been used in the United States to deal with local disputes over land use planning, the distribution of river waters, methods of disposing of hazardous waste materials, industry relocation, plans for desegregating public schools, police-community relations, methods of dealing with urban gangs, and numerous other public policy controversies. Local governments, in particular, have begun to alter their methods of governance to incorporate many of these techniques. Moreover, Federal legislation now mandates the increased use of PDR by U.S. administrative agencies. Techniques already in use include the mediation and conciliation of disputes among parties subject to the agency's jurisdiction (for example, by the Mediation and Conciliation Service of the U.S. Department of Labor and the Community Relations Service of the Justice Department); the practice of regulatory negotiation ("reg-neg"), which allows competing interest groups to participate more cooperatively in administrative rulemaking; the mediation of interagency disputes; and (a newer initiative) negotiated enforcement of rules that the agency believes have been violated but that cannot be enforced efficiently through the court system.

The growth of PDR raises a number of important questions for those interested in resolving public policy disputes. At its best, PDR helps revitalize democratic institutions by decentralizing decision making, involving interested parties directly in policymaking, and opening up bureaucratic systems to greater public participation. But the organized interest groups

that tend to participate most actively in these processes may not represent the public interest either individually or collectively. In such cases, the effect may be to advance what some call "interest group corporatism" rather than grass-roots democracy. Other critics have noted that governments sometimes use these techniques to avoid fulfilling their own responsibilities to take controversial positions. And still others worry about the tendency of those in power to set the agendas and the rules of PDR forums so as to avoid outcomes that would rock the boat or alter the system unduly. The prospects for PDR remain ambiguous. What will probably decide the character of these processes is a factor largely outside their reach. If all sectors of the population (including those presently unrepresented) are mobilized and organized to participate, public dispute resolution could fulfill its democratic promise. If they are not, PDR could turn out to be merely the latest form of corporatist elitism.

Alternatives to war or civil violence represent a third category of practice -- perhaps the most relevant to the theories of serious social conflict previously discussed. These processes are designed to deal with situations in which the legal and political consensus that supports normal dispute resolution has broken down or has never existed. The news headlines daily provide examples of such "intractable," violent struggles, often involving bitter conflict between racial or ethnic groups,

religious communities, nations, and social classes. Almost by definition, the parties to such conflicts are severely alienated, with unsatisfied basic needs and expectations and vital interests that require identification and satisfaction. Processes that aim at conflict resolution must assist them to construct a new system capable of satisfying these needs and rebuilding shattered relationships.

Deep-rooted conflicts are difficult to resolve, but not for the reasons that many observers suppose. The most serious problem may be the initial one of getting the parties to talk with one another. For if they are "entrapped" in a bitter, possibly escalating conflict, they may refuse to participate in any nonviolent process. Paradoxically, though, if the parties can be persuaded to participate, the very severity of their conflict frequently opens the door to its resolution. Unlike those involved in less intense disputes, they cannot disguise their antagonism or minimize its seriousness. The causes of their conflict obviously lie deeper than mere misunderstanding or "failure to communicate." And the system that formerly defined their relationship is visibly tottering, if not in ruins. As a result, the parties to violent social conflicts are often more capable of confronting underlying causes and problems than those involved in lower-intensity disputes.

The problem of bringing conflicting parties to the table, however, has provoked a debate between two schools of thought within the field. Advocates of compulsory processes favor

forcible intervention by powerful outsiders, if necessary, to compel warring parties to stop fighting and to negotiate. Other practitioners insist that only voluntary processes are capable of moving the parties towards problem-solving conflict resolution. The "compulsory settlement" school cites humanitarian reasons for ending the bloodshed and tends to view settlements, even if coerced, as steps toward conflict resolution. The advocates of "voluntary resolution" believe that since forcible third-party intervention is usually politically motivated, selective, and partisan, most coerced settlements only set the stage for further violence. The debate continues at present, sharpened by the mixed results of United Nations intervention in Somalia, the tragic complexities of Bosnia, and the inability of outsiders to end state terrorism in Haiti.

Voluntary conflict resolution is the purpose of one of the most widely discussed processes in current use: the analytical, problem-solving workshop (APSW). Participants in these workshops are frequently low-profile political figures, professionals, or influential scholars who have their leaders' consent to participate. The proceedings are held in private, with a strict ban on publicity of any sort; for obvious reasons, it is essential that the participation of delegates representing warring groups be "deniable." Generally, all parties whose failure to participate could wreck a conflict resolution agreement are included, but the preference of many practitioners is to begin by bringing together the most severely alienated

parties, and to broaden participation in subsequent workshops to include less central disputants, guarantors of the agreement, and other interested parties.

Almost always, the workshops (each lasting several days) are conducted in series, giving representatives a chance to report back to their headquarters, and providing opportunities for broadening participation. APSWS may be facilitated by governments not party to the conflict as a form of "second-track diplomacy," but they are often conducted by teams of facilitators independent of any government. (These experts may be associated with one or more of several dozen conflict studies centers and private peacemaking organizations around the world.) A major difficulty has been to provide parties in conflict with the impartial, trustworthy, competent facilitators they need, when governments with interests of their own in the conflict are often so eager to mediate.

APSWS generally proceed in five stages: preliminary statements of position (often featuring historical and legal arguments) by each party; collaborative work to identify the underlying or systemic causes of the conflict; generation of multiple options for eliminating these causes; "costing out" of these options by the parties; and (if the participants agree) construction of an agreement on basic principles and on immediate steps to be taken. Managing the crucial shift from adversary speechmaking to collaborative problem solving takes expert facilitation, but experience shows that even the most embittered

adversaries can make the transition. The strengths of the APSW process, which has been used in connection with a number of violent intergroup and international conflicts, have been its success in moving conflicting parties into a problem-solving mode and in helping them generate new options for resolution. (A recent example is the success of Norwegian facilitators in assisting Israeli and Palestinian representatives to reach agreement on a Declaration of Principles in Oslo.) Its main weakness has been the difficulty of implementing the understandings arrived at in workshops at the formal diplomatic and political level.

In part because of this problem, a number of other processes designed to deal with violent social and political conflicts are also currently in use. These include mediation and conciliation efforts by representatives of private and public international organizations; "peacemaking" workshops that attempt to establish relationships of trust between representatives of alienated parties and to heal the psychic wounds of conflict; forums involving structured contact between various types of citizen groups drawn from the opposed sides; creation of local and regional organizations competent to attempt conflict-resolving efforts within their jurisdictions; establishment of conflict studies or peace studies centers in universities on each side; and more. Studies evaluating and comparing the effectiveness of these processes are just now beginning to appear. We will hear a good deal more about them in the coming decade.

Conflict Resolution: Frontier Issues

Finally, journalists will want to consider some issues on the frontiers of conflict resolution theory and practice. Having roughly "mapped" the field, we are now in a position to peer a little way into some of the less explored areas, many of them involving modes of conflict, aspects of conflict psychology, and possibilities for resolution that are not yet well understood by either analysts or practitioners. Some examples (chosen from a large number of possible subjects) follow:

A clash of cultural or religious values poses difficult problems for those interested in conflict resolution. To the extent that intercultural conflicts are generated by economic or political problems, they may be resolved by making the changes needed to solve these problems. But if a clash of "worldviews" is sometimes a cause of conflict in itself, can the conflict be resolved? If so, how? Recent research suggests that differing worldviews are based on shared modes of discourse or "metaphors." Commonalities between them can be discovered which could permit what one scholar calls "metaphor dialogue." The aim of conflict resolution processes, in such cases, would be to develop a shared mode of discourse, a common conceptual language, that parties in conflict could agree to use in order to work out their differences without abandoning their own belief systems. This research seems promising, but it is still at an early stage of development.

The relationship of economic development to conflict resolution is a problem area now provoking intense interest and study, as well as some practical initiatives. Numerous studies make it clear that in many serious social conflict situations, economic development is an essential component of long-term resolution. But if domination of local economies by outside interests is both a characteristic of modern economies and a cause of conflict, how can development become autonomous? Similarly, if the exhaustion of natural resources is a cause of both present and future conflict, how can "sustainable development" become a generally accepted norm? These questions suggest that conflict resolution cannot succeed in practice without envisioning models of economic development alternative to those that now exist. Work on such models is now beginning in earnest.

Along similar lines, class conflict also presents problems that many conflict analysts have yet to face. The Western paradigm of bargainable interests, as we have seen, explains that class-based conflicts can be managed if social classes are considered to be represented or replaced by interest groups. But what if the classes themselves, rejecting redefinition as interest groups, decide to fight it out for supremacy? What if an existing interest group system decays, springing hostile social classes loose for conflict, or if modern economic systems continue to produce large, impoverished "underclasses"? The question raised here is whether nonviolent processes can be

developed that permit people to choose between alternative models of socioeconomic organization and development, and to alter a chosen system if they so decide. If not, class conflict will remain a "loose cannon" in the field of nonviolent conflict resolution.

Crime and punishment is a fourth frontier area for conflict resolvers. If the processes described earlier can be effective in dealing with serious transnational conflicts, might they not also be useful in resolving internal conflicts between criminals and the state? Since these conflicts tend to pit impoverished and minority groups against more prosperous majorities, the matter is both complex and pressing. A recent study suggests that "peacemaking" processes may be an answer to the vicious cycle in which nations like the United States now find themselves trapped: higher crime rates producing more severe penalties producing greater social disorganization producing higher crime rates. In small ways, the criminal justice system has already been invaded by alternative processes. For example, victim-offender reconciliation programs (VORPs) have taken root in dozens of communities around the United States as an alternative to conventional sentencing and imprisonment. But these programs suffer many of the weaknesses already attributed to ADR processes generally. What other processes might serve to expose the root causes of crime and to mobilize the public to make the changes needed to eliminate them?

Personal healing, forgiveness, and redemption are topics now moving from religious or psychological discourse into the vocabulary of conflict resolution. Some scholars and practitioners believe that trauma reduction and spiritual healing are an essential supplement to the analytical processes described earlier. Psychic wounds have often proven as great an obstacle to rebuilding shattered relationships as the physical destruction that accompanies intense warfare, and, unless they are healed, conflict attitudes may be passed on from generation to generation. The difficulty here has been to develop processes that are essentially therapeutic without subjecting people en masse to intrusive or manipulative psychic probing. Some simple truths have been rediscovered; for example, the healing power of public apologies and offers of compensation. But much work on the psychological aspects of conflict resolution remains to be done.

Considerable attention is also being focused on two related, if somewhat contradictory subjects: conflict resolution as public policy and "conflict resolution from below." Can conflict resolution be institutionalized, not only privately, but in the form of policies and practices administered by national and international governmental agencies? We have already had occasion to discuss the problems created when powerful nations with interests of their own enter a conflict situation as would-be peacemakers. Particularly controversial are efforts by superpowers to make peace between weaker parties under their

influence; the pros and cons of the Camp David Accords negotiated by President Jimmy Carter, for example, are still hotly debated. Most professionals in the conflict resolution field would like to see governments function as conflict resolvers, but when a powerful third party is part of the problem generating the conflict, the difficulties of obtaining genuine resolution under its auspices are obvious. One conference of conflict specialists has proposed that the "middle powers" (governments without extensive global power-interests) prepare to fulfill the role of impartial facilitators in regions outside their spheres of influence. This idea has already borne fruit in the case of the Norwegian facilitation of the Israel-Palestine conflict and may prove to be a productive suggestion in the future. But the viability of the Great Powers as conflict resolvers is still very much an open question.

Another proposal drawing current attention is to supplement conflict resolution processes that engage leaders in dialogue or in problem-solving workshops with activities designed to mobilize popular constituencies for conflict resolution. The matter is controversial, for the credibility of these new approaches to social conflict rests, in part, on their claim to be "above politics." Even so, post-Cold War experiences have persuaded some conflict resolvers that their role is inherently political, and that governments will continue to use their power in the old ways unless large numbers of people committed to alternative methods of resolving conflict organize to oppose them. Some of

these conflict specialists have joined forces with peace studies scholars and institutions around the world. Others have sponsored grass-roots conflict resolution initiatives, for example, by bringing together people from warring groups who have common interests in community development or the provision of social services. The future of conflict resolution will probably see more scholars and activists involved in a wide range of political activities.

The prospects for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the post-cold war world are not encouraging. With the end of the global struggle between the U.S. and Soviet blocs, violent struggles have been spreading and intensifying along a myriad of social and cultural fault lines. Today's conflicting parties are as likely to be ethnic, racial, religious, or gender-based communities as nation-states or multi-state blocs. Conflict within existing states is more common, and often more serious, than conflict between them. An unprecedented wave of mass migrations has exacerbated the existing causes of intergroup struggle. Both interpersonal and intercommunal violence are ubiquitous; no state or region, not even the most prosperous and powerful, is exempt.

These grim realities are what has driven us to offer journalists a brief production to conflict analysis and resolution. Our presence in this handbook is that the media stand central in the public's understanding of social conflict at all levels. More important, we believe that parties frequently take action against each other based on media-mediated notions of each other. Reporting on conflict has therefore become an integral part of conflict and its resolution, and an understanding of conflict dynamics and conflict resolution techniques has become an imperative for journalists.

We have argued in this handbook that journalism is a powerful form of social intervention with potentially damaging effects. The most neutral and objective attempt at describing, identifying, or evaluating a conflict can have serious impact on its dynamics and its outcome. At the same time, journalists have the ability to clarify issues and create understanding between various kinds of disputants. Twenty years ago -- before the advent of much of the technology that is not used in all forms of print and electronic media -- the view of the media's task in conflict was very limited. Reporters were sometimes asked to encourage the role of conflict settlement mechanisms such as negotiation and mediation. At most they were made aware of their responsibility to contribute to a climate in which peaceful solutions were possible. Today, however, parties often negotiate through the media, and in many forms of journalism various aspects of the mediator's role have been taken on by journalists themselves.

Our hope (to paraphrase a slogan of the 1960s) is that by becoming better conflict analysts, journalists can become part of the solution rather than part of the problem. Conflict resolution depends upon one's ability to describe conflicts accurately, to identify the problems that generate them, and to evaluate proposed solutions. Each of these tasks can be used to generate a short list of "do's" and "don't's" for journalists. The material already presented in this handbook makes it unnecessary to discuss these guidelines at length. We apologize

for the bare-bones style and didactic tone of what follows, but bluntness sometimes pays.

The primary rule in describing conflicts is: Don't take sides. One cannot describe a conflict accurately until one has looked at it, thought about it, and, as far as possible, experienced it emotionally from the perspective of each party.

A corollary rule is: Question the "prepackaged" descriptions that the parties or interested outsiders will invariably supply. You will be told that a particular conflict is a case of democracy versus dictatorship, or peacelovers versus warmongers, law-enforcers versus criminals, reasonable folk versus fanatics, etc. Look behind the labels even when -- this is not easy -- they are part of your own culture or mindset.

Similarly, question the specific model of conflict that others (including your own colleagues) will use initially to "frame" the facts. Is what you are asked to describe a violent crime, a spontaneous riot, a gang war, a family dispute, an act of personal desperation, or an act of civil war? Does any specific model "fit" the facts as you see them? Don't let anyone else's model usurp your independent judgment.

Dig for features of the conflict that are not apparent on the surface. Ask: Who are the parties, really? What is the history of their relationship? Are all the parties to this conflict participating? To what extent has the conflict become self-generating? Are outsiders stirring the pot? And: What are

the real issues in contention? What do the parties hope to achieve as a result of their efforts? What will it take to satisfy them? Are there any obvious third parties available if their services should be needed?

Understand that one's first attempt to describe a conflict is always provisional. The journalist begins by identifying what appear to be the relevant parties, issues, and interactions; but further analysis often throws new light (and new shadows) on the initial description. Don't overcommit in the initial stage of analysis. Overcommitting to a theory or framework early on can lead to bandwagon or pack journalism which not only makes it difficult to break from a particular reporting mode, but also distorts the analysis of the conflict to the point where it could have serious implications for its outcome.

In identifying underlying problems, the first rule is: Don't confuse a "trigger" or immediate cause of conflict with an underlying cause. Don't abort the inquiry because some people think that the cause is obvious (e.g., that the verdict in Rodney King's case caused the Los Angeles Riot, or that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait caused the Persian Gulf War). Look for underlying problems, not just triggering acts.

Distinguish, too, between the necessary conditions (or sine qua nons) for conflict and the conflict's active causes. Injustice may be a necessary condition for rebellion, for example, but people will often suffer injustice for a long time

without rebelling. Ask why this conflict is occurring now, and not earlier or later? Why is it taking place here and not in some other place?

Recognize that your search for underlying problems is guided by some paradigm of conflict, and know what paradigm you are using. Also understand that your theory of conflict and its resolution may be totally different from that of one or both of the parties. Try out alternative frameworks to see if they illuminate the sources of the struggle. Don't be afraid to combine elements of different paradigms if that makes sense to you.

Test your conclusions by asking: What would happen if these underlying problems were solved? Would the conflict continue anyhow? Would it become less destructive? Would it terminate?

In the task of evaluating proposed solutions the key rule is: Distinguish between proposals to settle the conflict and proposals to resolve it. Settlements can be obtained by imposing a truce on the parties or through power-based negotiations. Resolution depends upon solving underlying problems. Ask: Does this proposal get at any or all of the underlying problems? Furthermore, can the stipulations of the agreement be implemented in a timely fashion? Will the constituents of the negotiators accept this agreement which was made on their behalf?

Recognize that settlement proposals may either be steps on the road to conflict resolution or incubators of renewed

conflict. Others may view a settlement either as establishing a permanent peace between the parties or as utterly useless and counterproductive. Whether the general mood is euphoric or cynical, however, ask: Does this settlement exacerbate the underlying problems, or could it lead in the direction of solving them? And if the latter, what steps are necessary?

Remember that true conflict resolution is often an ongoing process of institutionalized peacemaking that might regularly need fine tuning between the parties. It is seldom a one-time deal or settlement.

Look warily at proposals that purport to resolve serious social conflicts without seriously altering the status quo. Remember that the parties in conflict are often led by elites that find social or political change threatening. Don't accept their often anaemic sense of what is "realistically possible." But don't discount their potential to undertake serious change from above either.

Recognize that it is the parties, finally, not some outsider with a peace plan in his or her pocket, who must finally assess the costs and benefits of any proposed solution, as well as its "salability" to their constituents. Ask: How do the parties' representatives really feel about this proposal? Have they had an opportunity to cost it out together? Can they sell it to their people?

At each stage in the process of description, analysis, and evaluation, journalists may find it useful to consult with relevant specialists in conflict analysis and resolution, as well as with others knowledgeable about the particular conflict they are covering. In the hope that dialogue between journalists and other conflict specialists will grow and deepen, we have appended to this handbook several lists outlining various types of conflict resolution resources that reporters and editors may find useful: books, academic institutions, directories, providers of mediation or facilitation services, journals, professional associations, and resources outside the United States. Readers are encouraged to use the listed resources and are invited to continue the discussion begun here by contacting the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.

VIII. APPENDIX: CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION RESOURCES

To describe all the literary and human resources available to journalists interested in conflict analysis and resolution would involve creating a document far longer than this handbook. Both academically and in its practical initiatives, the field is currently "exploding." A large number of academic programs and practitioners in a wide range of conflict and dispute resolution settings are North American, but interest in conflict studies and in new methods of handling serious conflicts is growing very rapidly around the globe. Evidence of this can be seen in the number of academic programs, mediation services, and conflict resolution centers that are being established in the Middle East, Eastern European countries, Africa, and in the former Soviet Republics. Journalists will want to take particular note of the "Directories" section below, which refers to other listings or descriptions of available resources.

What follows is, therefore, a partial inventory of these resources: books in English, practitioners (particularly in the United States), academic resources, directories, professional associations, magazines and journals, and resources outside the United States. The exclusion of any person or organization from this Appendix is evidence of nothing but the authors' lack of space or lapses of memory. Our foreign listings are particularly idiosyncratic, being based on "networks" of academics and

practitioners with which we happen to be familiar. With these many limitations, it is hoped that journalists will find this brief inventory useful.

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3. Academic and Educational Programs (USA)

The following programs are listed alphabetically by the name of the college or university at which they are located:

Program on Dispute Resolution, Dr. Michael Lang, Director.
Antioch University, 800 Livermore Street, Yellow Springs, OH

45387 (513) 767-6321.

Conflict Consortium, Dr. Paul Wehr/Dr. Heidi Burgess, Co-Directors. Campus Box 327, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO

80309 (303) 492-7798.

Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution, Dr. Kevin

Clements, Director. George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

22030-4444 (703) 993-1300.

Consortium on Multi-Party Conflict, Center for Planning and

Development, Dr. R. Gregory Bourne, Co-Director. Georgia

Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332-0155 (404) 894-2350.

Program on Negotiation, Dr. Deborah Kolb, Director. Harvard

Law School, 500 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138 (612) 376-2740,

(612) 625-0362.

Program on Conflict Resolution, Dr. Neal Milner, Director.

University of Hawaii, 2424 Maile Way, Porteus 111, Honolulu, HA

96822 (808) 948-6433.

Research Center for Dispute Resolution, Dr. Jean Brett,

Director. Northwestern University, Leveque Hall, 2001 Sheridan

Road, Evanston, IL 60201 (312) 491-3470.

Program on Conflict Management Alternatives, Dr. Mark Chesler, Director. University of Michigan, 4501 LSA Building, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 (313) 764-7487, 763-0472.

Conflict and Change Program, Dr. Thomas Futak, Director. University of Minnesota, 1114 Social Sciences, 267 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455 (315) 423-2346.

Center for Research in Conflict & Negotiation, Dr. Kalyan Chatterjee, Director. Pennsylvania State University, 424 Beam Business Administration Bldg., University Park, PA 16802 (814) 865-0197.

Center for Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Dr. Sanford Jaffe, Director. Rutgers University, 15 Washington Street, 12th Floor, Newark, NJ 07102 (201) 648-5541.

Stanford Center on Conflict & Negotiation, Dr. Robert H. Mnookin, Director. Crown Quadrangle, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-8610 (415) 723-2300.

Program on Analysis & Resolution of Conflict, Dr. Louis Kriesberg, Director. Syracuse University, 712 Ostrom Avenue, Syracuse, NY 13244-4300 (315) 423-2346.

Center for Peace & Conflict Studies, Dr. Frederick Pearson, Director. Wayne State University, 2319 Faculty Administrative Building, Detroit, MI 48202 (313) 577-3453.

Dispute Processing Research Program, Institute for Legal Studies, Dr. Marc Galanter, Director. University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 (608) 262-2240.

William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Mr. Steven Toben,
Program Officer. 525 Middlefield Road, Suite 200, Menlo Park, CA
94025 (415) 329-1070.

4. Conflict Resolution and Dispute Services (North America)

Community or neighborhood dispute resolution centers exist in most large cities and in many medium and smaller cities. To find such an organization in your locale:

(a) Consult the directories of the Section on Dispute Resolution of the American Bar Association. American Bar Association Section on Dispute Resolution, 1800 M Street, NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331-2258.

(b) Call a local university or college.

(c) In larger cities consult the Yellow Pages under "Mediation" or "Crisis Intervention."

(d) See the listing below (7) for a short list of independent conflict resolution practitioners.

The Community Relations Service was established by the 1964 Civil Rights Act to mediate racial disputes. It has 10 regional offices which are located in the following cities: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Kansas City, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle. Headquarters: Community Relations Service, U.S. Department of Justice, 5550 Friendship Blvd., Suite 330, Chevy Chase, MD 20815 (301) 492-5943.

Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). FMCS provides services to federal agencies including: consultation on policies and programs, training in skills and procedures, and

mediators and facilitators. Headquarters: Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 2100 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20427 (202) 653-2055.

Cities, municipalities, counties, and states often have government agencies which perform mediation and conciliation functions. Some examples include: Human Relations Commission, Human Rights Commission, Community Relations Commission.

Several states have mediation offices as an official part of the state government. These include: Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington. Additional states are developing offices.

Other state or local agencies where mediation services may be provided include offices of consumer affairs and court-affiliated mediation programs. In the private sector, the Better Business Bureau may provide such services.

The following organizations provide direct mediation services, short courses, and workshops:

The Alban Institute, Rev. Speed Leas, Director. 4125 Nebraska Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20016 (202) 244-7320 (Education Office: 1-800-457-8893).

Applied Practice and Theory Program, Institute for Conflict Analysis Resolution, Frank Blechman, Wallace Warfield, and Juliana Birkhoff. George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444 (703) 993-3650.

Geoff Ball & Associates, Geoff Ball, President. 164 Main Street, Suite 210, Los Altos, CA 94022 (415) 941-1497.

Susan Carpenter Associates. 1955 Bronson Way, Riverside, CA 92506-3526 (714) 784-7307.

CDR Associates, Mary Margaret Golten, Admin. Partner. 100 Arapahoe Avenue, Suite 12, Boulder, CO 80302 (303) 442-7367 or 1-800-MEDIATE.

Center for Dispute Settlement, Linda Singer, Executive Director. 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20009 (202) 265-9572, (703) 683-8522.

Clean Sites, Thomas P. Grumbly. 1199 North Fairfax Street, Suite 400, Alexandria, VA 22314 (703) 683-8522.

Community Board Program, Inc., Terry Amsler, Executive Director. 1540 Market Street, Suite 490, San Francisco, CA 94102 (415) 552-1250.

Conflict Management, Inc., Elizabeth Gray, Chief Executive. 20 University Road, Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 547-8415.

Friends Conflict Resolution Program. 1515 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215) 241-7234.

Institute for Environmental Negotiation, Richard Collins, Director. Campbell Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903 (804) 924-1970.

Interaction Associates, Inc., David Straus, President. 124 Mount Auburn Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 354-2000.

Justice Center of Atlanta, Inc., Randall F. Dobbs, Executive Director. 976 Edgewood Avenue, NE, Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 523-8236.

Lemmon Mediation Institute, John Allen Lemmon, Director. 5248 Boyd Avenue, Oakland, CA 94618 (510) 547-8089.

The Mediation Institute, Stephen K. Erickson, Director. 7825 Washington Ave. South, Suite 223, Minneapolis, MN 55439 (617) 944-8636.

The Mediation Institute, Alana Knaster, President. 22231 Mulholland Highway, Suite 103, Woodland Hills, CA 91364 (818) 591-9526.

Mennonite Conciliation Service, Jim Stutzman, Director. 21 South 12th Street, Akron, PA 17501 (717) 859-3889.

Northern Virginia Mediation Service, Robert Scott, Director. 4103 Chain Bridge Road, Fairfax, VA 22030 (703) 993-3656.

PennACCORD, Wendy Emrich, Director. 1211 Chestnut St., Suite 900, Philadelphia, PA 19107 (215) 563-7860, (215) 563-0250.

Program for Community Problem Solving, William R. Potapchuk, Executive Director. 1301 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20004 (202) 626-3183.

RESOLVE, Gail Bingham, Director. 1250 24th Street, NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20037 (202) 778-9634.

The following organizations provide mediation services only:

Endispute, Inc., William Hartgering. 303 W. Madison Street, 17th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 419-4650 (other offices in Washington, Cambridge, and New York).

Mary Means Associates, Inc., 428 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA
22314 (703) 684-2215.

Roger Stuart Richman, 404 Jackson Street, Falls Church, VA
22046 (703) 534-1526, (804) 683-3967.

The following organizations offer workshops and trainings:

Academy of Family Mediators, Linda Wilkerson, Executive
Director. 1500 South Highway 100, Suite 355, Golden Valley, MN
55416 (612) 525-8670.

Carl Vinson Institute of Government, Margaret Herrman,
Professor. 201 North Milledge Avenue, Athens, GA 30602 (404)
542-2736.

Keystone Center, Robert Craig, President. P.O. Box 8606,
Keystone, CO 80435-7998 (303) 468-5822.

Michael Doyle & Associates. 210 Columbus Avenue, Suite 221,
San Francisco, CA 94133 (415) 441-0696.

Program on the Analysis & Resolution of Conflict, Neil Katz,
Director. 712 Ostrom Avenue, Syracuse, NY 13244-4400 (315)
443-2367.

Southeast Negotiation Network Center for Planning and
Development. Co-directors: Michael Elliott (404) 853-9891 and
Gregory Bourne (404) 853-9846. Georgia Institute of Technology,
Atlanta, GA 30332.

University of Missouri-St. Louis, Summer Institute in
Conflict Intervention, Miranda Duncan, Director. Social Science
Building #347, St. Louis, MO 63121 (314) 553-6040.

5. Directories

Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). ACUS is an independent federal agency which can be used by agency officials and parties for disputes involving federal agencies or statutes. A roster of dispute resolution specialists is available through ACUS. Manager of Roster Services, Administrative Conference of the United States, 2120 L Street, NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20037 (202) 254-7020.

American Arbitration Association. The American Arbitration Association has a wide range of resource materials and literature available through their Eastman Library. Laura Ferris Brown, Chief Librarian, American Arbitration Association, 140 West 51st Street, New York, NY 10020 (212) 484-4003.

American Bar Association (ABA). The ABA Dispute Resolution Program Directory is a survey that includes detailed information on more than 200 dispute resolution programs and many practitioners and services, by state. Included are programs on various types of disputes from interpersonal to community, corporate, and industrial. The most recent directory is 1993. 1990 Law School Directory of Dispute Resolution Programs. Selected profiles of law schools which have programs in the dispute resolution field. American Bar Association Section on Dispute Resolution, 1800 M Street, NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331-2584.

Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development
(COPRED). A Directory of Peace Studies Programs, August 1991. A listing of peace studies and conflict resolution programs in the United States and several other countries. A religious affiliation index is included at the end. COPRED Directory of Membership. COPRED, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 (703) 993-6395.

Five-College Program in Peace and World Security Studies. Guide to Careers and Graduate Education in Peace Studies, 1987. A guide to university and law school programs in peace studies and conflict resolution. Also provides a listing of peacemaking organizations and an explanation of careers in the field of Peace Studies. The Five-College Program in Peace and World Security Studies, Hampshire College, Amherst, MA 01002 (413) 549-4606.

National Association for Mediation in Education (NAME). Directory of School Mediation and Conflict Resolution Programs. Profiles of over 200 programs in the United States, including information about histories, funding sources, training methods, curricula and consulting resources. Directory of NAME Membership. National Association for Mediation in Education, 425 Amity Street, Amherst, MA 01002 (413) 545-2467.

Program for Community Problem Solving. Resource List and Guide -- Individuals and Organizations that Provide Process Assistance to Communities. A nationwide directory of individuals and organizations running community problem-solving programs that include representatives of affected groups and that use consensus

to make decisions. A helpful guide for contracting such services is also included. Program for Community Problem Solving, 915 15th Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC 20005 202-626-3138.

Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR).

Directory of SPIDR Membership (available to members), 815 15th Street, NW, Suite 530, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 783-7279.

Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs (VORP). National VORP Directory. A nationwide directory of Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs in the United States which includes the key characteristics of each program as well as a listing of programs in Canada and England. National VORP Resource Center, Pact Institute of Justice, 106 Franklin Street, Valparaiso, IN 46383 (219) 462-1127.

6. Journals and Newsletters

Conciliation Quarterly Newsletter. Mennonite Central Committee, 21 South 12th Street, Box M, Akron, PA 17501.

COPRED Peace Chronicle. Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030.

Dispute Resolution. ABA Section on Dispute Resolution, 1800 M Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036.

ICC Link. Interfaith Conciliation Center, Joint Strategies & Action Committee, 199 North Columbus Ave., Mount Vernon, NY 10553.

Journal of Conflict Resolution. Sage Publications, Inc., 2111 West Hillcrest Drive, Newberry Park, CA 91320.

Journal of Dispute Resolution. School of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, MO 65201.

Mediat Quarterly. Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers, 350 Sansome Street, San Francisco, CA 94104 (The Academy of Family Mediators).

Negotiation Journal. Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School, 500 Pound Hall, Cambridge, MA 02138.

NIDR Forum. National Institute for Dispute Resolution, 1901 L Street NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20036.

Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution. School of Law, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210.

Peace In Action. Foundation for P.E.A.C.E. P.O. Box 244,
Arlington, VA 22210.

SPIDR News. Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.
815 15th St. NW, Suite 530, Washington, DC 20005.

USIP Newsletter. United States Institute of Peace, 1550 M
Street NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20005.

7. Associations and Professional Organizations (USA)

These national associations can help you find resources for training and referral, as well as conflict analysis. Several are at the forefront of establishing standards for mediation and other third-party services.

Academy of Family Mediators. 1500 South Highway 100, Suite 355, Golden Valley, MN 55416 (612) 525-8670.

American Arbitration Association. 1730 Rhode Island Ave., NW, Suite 909, Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331-7073.

American Bar Association (ABA) Section on Dispute Resolution. 1800 M Street, NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331-2258.

Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED). George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 (703) 993-3639.

National Association for Mediation in Education (NAME). 25 Amity Street, Amherst, MA 01002 (413) 545-2462.

National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR). George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 (703) 934-5140.

National Institute for Dispute Resolution. 1901 L Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 466-4764.

Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. 815 15th Street NW, Suite 530, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 783-7277.

8. Resources Outside the United States

Canadian Institute for Conflict Resolution (Robert Birt).

c/o St. Paul University, 249 Main Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1S

1C4 Canada.

Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation. 50

O'Connor Street, Suite 1422, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 6L2 Canada.

Centre for the Analysis of Conflict (John Groom).

Rutherford College, University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NX,

United Kingdom.

Centre for Conflict Resolution (Gregory Tillet). MacQuarie

University, Sydney, North Ryde, New South Wales, Australia 61-2

805 8873.

Centre for Conflict Resolution (Nick Lewer). Department of

Peace Studies, University of Bradford, W. Yorks BD7 1DP, United

Kingdom (44-274 733 466).

Centre for Dispute Resolution. 3 Norwich Street, London

EC4A 1ES, United Kingdom (44-71 430 1852).

Director, Center for Intergroup Studies (Ron Kraybill).

University of Cape Town, 1 Groto Road, Rondebosch 7700, South

Africa (27-21 685 3710).

Centre for Peace Studies (Kevin Clements). Australian

National University, Canberra, Australia (61-6-61 249 0174).

Center for Peace and Conflict Studies (Peter King).

Department of Government and Public Administration, University of

Sydney, New South Wales 2006, Australia (67-2 692 2222).

- Centre for the Study of Conflict (John Darby). University of Coleraine, Northern Ireland BT52 1SA (44-265 441 41).
- European University Center for Peace Studies (James Skelly). A-7461 Schläining, Austria (33 55 2498).
- Family Mediation Canada (Paul Young). 123 Woolwich Street, 2nd Floor, Guelph, Ontario, N1H 3V1, Canada.
- Gernika Gogoratuz (Peace Research Center) (Juan Gutierrez). Gernika-Lomoko Udala Foruen Emparantza, z.g.E-48300 Gernika, Bizkai, Spain (34-43 470 526).
- Institute for the Study and Resolution of Conflict (Gavin Bradshaw). University of Port Elizabeth, P.O. Box 1600, Port Elizabeth 6000, South Africa.
- Life and Peace Institute (Bernt Johansson). P.O. Box 2975751-05, Uppsala, Sweden (46-18 169 500).
- Nairobi Peace Initiative (Hizkias Assefa). Wamini House, P.O. Box 14894, Nairobi, Kenya (254-2 441 444).
- Newham Conflict and Change Project (Peter Bevan). Christopher House, 2A Streatfield Road, London E6 2LA, United Kingdom (44-81 552 2050).
- The Network: Interaction for Conflict Resolution (Sylvia McMechan). Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G6 Canada.
- Widgespruit Fellowship Trust, P.O. Box 81, Roodepoort 1725, South Africa (27-11 768 1310).

9. Conflict Resolution Media Awards

American Conflict Resolution Media Award, administered by the Conflict Resolution Center International, Inc. Contact: Paul Wahrhaftig, Conflict Resolution Center International, Inc., 2205 E. Carson Street, Pittsburgh, PA, 15203-2107.

Award for Journalistic Excellence in Conflict Analysis, created by Fund for Dispute Resolution, administered by Canadian Association of Journalists. Contact: Rosemarie Schmidt, Fund for Dispute Resolution, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G5, Canada.

Media Peace Award, administered by the Conflict Resolution Network. Contact: Stella Cornelius, Conflict Resolution Network, P.O. Box 1016, Chatswood, New South Wales, 2057, Australia.

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<i>Comrade Valentine</i>, by Richard E. Rubenstein, 1994	\$24.95	_____	_____

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